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ABSTRACT
TELEVISION AND THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE
IN THE ERA OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
John E. Roos
Old Dominion University
Director:
Dr. Philip Taylor

The role television played in the integration of
Europe through 1987 is examined in an analysis focusing on
historical trends,

integration theory, and the effect of

satellite technology on the political environment in
Europe.

Television remained under the jurisdiction of

national governments since its inception,

satellite

communications challenged the system of national control of
television and changed television's role in Europe by
introducing a revolutionary new delivery system.
Integration theorists are cited to define the integration
process and provide a foundation for a study of
television's impact on European integration.

Television

policies in each nation are examined to document their past
nationalistic nature.

Intergovernmental organizations are

surveyed to understand their function in the formulation of
European television policies.

The private sector's use of

satellites is cited to document how its actions encouraged
integration in the marketplace.

It is shown that the

integration of the television market will precede European
integration and that satellite television provided the
communication tool that will stimulate this integration.
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CHAPTER ONE
EUROPEAN TELEVISION AND
THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE

On November 1, 1986, a television service that
described itself as the first "truly European television
service" ceased operations.1

Appropriately enough,

it had

been called ’’Europa," and in concept it was to have
created an entertainment and information source that
people throughout the continent could watch regardless of
the language they spoke.

Europa was to utilize audio

subcarriers on new, European-built and -launched
satellites to simulcast programs throughout Europe in all
its major languages.

This technology made it possible to

have many separate voice channels for each video image,
enabling all Europeans to watch the same programs, yet hear
them in their own languages.2
Europa was created in 1984 by the European

1Throughout this thesis, "Europe” will refer
specifically to the nations of western Europe.
This will
exclude activities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Albania, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and
the German Democratic Republic.
2 European Broadcasting Union, "Europa:
for Olympus Satellite," 1986, pp. 1-4.

Television

1
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Broadcasting Union

(EBU), the consortium of more than 100

private companies and national government departments
responsible for broadcasting activities throughout Europe.3
From its beginning it was designed as a service to bring
Europe together and champion European culture in its many
varieties.
Europe."

It adopted the motto,

"From Europe,

for

Its programs were to be of European origin

because "Europe has its own culture and wholly European
programming will reflect that culture and contribute to
it."

Programs also were to be selected for appeal to all

Europeans to foster solidarity.4
Another major European intergovernmental
organization

(IGO) which championed Europa was the European

Economic Community

(EC).

The creation of Europa partly

was in response to a resolution of March 12, 1982, by the
EC's European Parliament

(EP), which called for the

establishment of a "European television channel."3

The EC

Commission lobbied for wide participation and funding and

3 Television is a broadcasting medium,
involving the
electronic distribution of simultaneous visual and audio
images.
It is also a communications medium, and a
telecommunications medium, a term referring to the relaying
of communication through electronic impulses.
While
broadcasting also refers to media such as radio, and
telecommunications encompasses such media as telephones and
telegraph, when used in this thesis these terms apply to
television.

4 European Broadcasting Union,

"Europa," pp. 2-3.

3 Commission of the European Communities, Television
Without Frontiers, (COM (84) 300) (1984), p. 12.
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gave $1 million from its own budget in October 1986 to
sustain Europa operations.6

The Commission believed Europa

was a television service that could help fulfill its goal
of "a unified European market in goods and services by
1992. "7
The EC took a more vigorous role in encouraging
European television activities because leaders throughout
the Community concluded that television was pivotal in
shaping the future of Europe.
Lord Cockfield,

Commission Vice President,

expressed the view of the Commission that

television was not just an entertainment medium or another
business.

"Television does not merely reflect but plays an

important role in forming our modern society and our modern
Europe."

He concluded that "a fragmented Europe of

national broadcasters is political and economic nonsense."8
This echoed the E P 's charge that national government
control of television and other mass media undermined
efforts to foster a European identification among the
peoples of Europe and reenforced national loyalties.
"Information" was "the most decisive factor in European
unification," but the system in which "information via the

6Ripa di Meana, speech delivered at the Conference
on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October
16, 1986.
7 Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes Common Standards
for Television," E u r o p e , December 1986, p. 16.
8 Ibid.
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mass media is controlled at the national level" must be
superseded by a uniform television policy if European
unification was to be achieved.9
The Europa project developed significant support
throughout the Community.
Programming, production,
higher than expected,

Yet it faced many obstacles.
and transmission costs proved

and viewing audiences and advertising

revenues were below projections.

Although backed by the

EBU, Europa was not financially supported by most EBU
member-nations, since each nation retained the option of
whether or not to participate.

Such nations as France and

the U.K. expressed interest in Europa,10 but after more
than a year of operation,

only five nations were

participating in the project:
nation), West Germany,

the Netherlands

Portugal,

Ireland,

and Italy.

though it was supported by these governments,
EP, the EC Commission,

(the host

the EBU,

and other organizations,

forced to halt operations.

However,

Even
the

Europa was

the collapse of

Europa brought new focus on the role of television in
shaping the future of Europe.

Europa had begun to

demonstrate the potential of satellite television to
provide daily programming for many nations simultaneously,
but the fragmented European marketplace of 1986 made

9Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 2.
10Di Meana Speech.
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success impossible.11
Europe's inability to work together to sustain
Europa symbolized European political and economic realities
in the mid-1980s.

Europa's demise came during the same

year the Community approved the "Single European Act," by
which the EC became committed to the creation of a truly
common market by 1992.

The Community was to exist without

internal impediments to the flow of goods and services
throughout Europe.12

But actions of Community member-

nations in failing to support television activities like
Europa seemed to contradict their commitment to pursue
greater unification.

Ripa di Meana,

the EC Commissioner

for Information and Culture, was one of the Community
leaders who was puzzled by these contradictions. He
believed the failure of Europe's nation-states to support
Europa proved that Europe was still fragmented and
approached issues primarily from national perspectives.13
European unification was the goal of men like Ripa
di Meana and Lord Cockfield who worked within the political
realm.

At the same time,

the actions of these men,

nations, and organizations were continuously scrutinized by

^ P a m e l a Williams and Laurel Wentz, "Europa TV in
Trouble," Advertising A g e . November 10, 1986, p. 72.
1 2 "The Institutions of the European Community,"
E u rope, May 1987, p. 23.
13 "Losses Prompt Europa Channel to Shut Down
Operations," Multichannel N e w s . December 15, 1986, p. 23.
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political scientists who were students cf the integration
process.

Europe became a living laboratory for these

scientists as they sought to study the formation of
political organizations and to understand more clearly the
actions that took place in Europe.

Integration theorists

analyzed the formation of nations and identified the
causes and impediments of integration.
terms such as "integration."

They also defined

Europe was a region of on

going study because of its unique history and composition.
Scientists specifically probed developments in post-World
War II Europe to examine events in light of developed
theory.
One of the most influential studies of the subject
was a 1957 inquiry conducted by Karl Deutsch and seven
colleagues at Princeton University.

They defined

"integration" as "the attainment, within a territory, of a
'sense of community'

and of institutions and practices

strong enough and widespread enough to assure,

for a 'long'

time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change'
its population."

among

These scholars defined "sense of

community" as a "belief on the part of individuals in a
group that they have come to agreement on at least this one
point:

that common social problems must and can be

resolved by processes of peaceful change."14

Using this

14 Karl Deutsch, Sidney Burrell, Robert Kann,
Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren,
Francis Loewenheim, Richard Van Wagener, Political
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broad definition Europe could be described as "integrated.”
Deutsch,

et al., divided integrated groups of people into

two classifications:
(1) Groups became amalgamated when previously
independent units merged into a new single larger unit,
with a common government.

The United States was an example

of this kind of organization.

Since European nations

retained independent governments,

Europe was not

amalgamated.
(2) In contrast, pluralistic communities were
composed of nations with legally independent governments.
This kind of community existed when key leaders held
relatively harmonized beliefs and expectations and acted
in a predictable manner toward each other and the world.
The relationship between the United States and Canada was
an example of a pluralistic community.

Since European

nations maintained separate governments and had developed
harmonized beliefs and expectations,

Europe qualified as a

pluralistic community.13
The respected integration theorist, Ernst Haas,
defined "political integration" as "the process whereby
political actors in several distinct national settings are
persuaded to shift their loyalties,

expectations and

Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 6.
13 Ibid.
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political activities toward a new center, whose
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre
existing national states."16

Within this definition,

Europe fell short of complete integration.

The shift in

loyalties was partial, and jurisdiction remained largely in
the hands of national governments.

However, developments

related to satellite television demonstrated that
expectations began to shift toward a new center in Europe
and illustrated the important function television could
play in integration.
Another integration theorist, Amitai Etzioni,
distinguished between political communities and a larger
group, which he called "political systems."

When parts of

systems were "interrelated," they might have different
levels of integration.
"interdependent."

These kinds of systems were

On the other hand, members of political

communities were "integrated."

This "integration of the

members of a community is self-maintained by definition."17
Etzioni divided the unification process into four stages:
(1)

The first was the preunification stage, which

involved an identification of each individual unit before
unification,

a view of these units in aggregate form,

the

environment which impacted the unification,

and the degree

16 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe
Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.

(Stanford:

17Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex
Organizations (New York:
The Free Press, 1961), p. 137.
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of interdependence and integration before the integration
process began.

Television was an environmental factor in

this process.
(2) The second stage focused on the various ways
elite groups influenced these units.
force

When action involved

(including military, economic, or psychological),

power was said to be coercive.

the

Elite groups acted in

utilitarian ways when their actions came about through
interaction in common social contexts.
debate,

In the television

the elites in Europe included various governmental

and intergovernmental organizations,
groups, business organizations,
(3)

special interest

and entrepreneurs.

In the third stage, preunification

transitional conditions came into being and various groups
and forces acted to bring about greater integration.
Unification was achieved in increasing unit sectors.
Europe,

In

this phase was being stimulated by the development

of satellite television and the actions taken to increase
pan-European television activity.
(4)

The final stage concluded the process, when

the organization became integrated or the integration
process s topped.18
This thesis utilizes the model developed by Etzioni
as it applies to the situation in Europe at the end of
1987.

With Etzioni's four-stage model as a basis,

18 Ibi d . , pp. 15, 16, 37, 51.
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supplemented by the work of Haas and Deutsch, the concept
that integration of television activity is leading to the
integration of Europe is tested.

The thesis demonstrates

that satellite television modified the character of the
European television industry and forced changes in efforts
by national governments to control television activities.
It shows that the introduction of satellite technology made
television policy a bellwether of European integration
efforts.

If the nations of Europe were found to be

blocking further integration of the television market,

it

is hypothesized that then they were blocking integration
itself.

The evolution of the television industry

throughout Europe is cited as evidence of the impact of
satellite technology on national controls over television
and the decisions nations were forced to make regarding
their overall role in the future of Europe.
This hypothesis assumes that no radical political
changes take place to affect significantly economic,
military, or political power in Europe or the world.

It

also assumes that the nations of Europe continue to work
through their differences amicably, eschewing courses of
action that would increase nationalism or divisiveness,
and would actively embrace a European approach to their
problems.

It presumes that there would be no social,

climatic, religious,

scientific, geological,

or

sociological changes of any significance to alter radically
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the nature of society in Europe.

While this thesis seeks

to determine whether television in Europe acted as a
catalyst to stimulate integration, other scenarios are
possible.
In one scenario, integration would decline as the
Europeanization of television and the European nations are
resisted and nation-states reaffirm their controls.
this scenario,

In

satellite television would be developed in

Europe, but nations would take steps to assure continued
jurisdiction over this medium.

In a second scenario,

integration would develop simultaneously along two or more
paths.

Some nations would elect to limit their

participation in the integration process,

electing to

retain national control over television policy and other
aspects of their national life and culture.

However,

other

nations would determine to proceed with integration on a
regional or lesser scale.

A third scenario would be the

continuation of the situation as it existed in 1987.
Integration would be acknowledged as a goal to be pursued,
but national governments would retain national identity and
individuality as a priority,

thus restricting the

development of integration.
Using the television industry in Europe in 1987 as
a reference point,

this thesis demonstrates the degree to

which Europe lacked unity, particularly in the p re
satellite era.

It will trace the development of television
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throughout the continent and detail the policies and
practices that evolved to govern its operations.

The

history of television in each European nation is cited as
proof of the nationalistic nature of the television
industry prior to 1987.

This evolution resulted in

markedly different and sometimes contradictory policies as
each nation pursued television along individual lines.

It

is demonstrated that these non-complementary policies
acted to discourage unification by reenforcing national
loyalties,

traditions, and customs.

These were

environmental factors in stage one of Etzioni*s model.
However,

the introduction of satellite communications

provided new challenges both to the television industry and
the governments of Europe.
The role of IGOs involved with television is
detailed as the elite groups of Europe acted to bring about
more coordination of television policies.
second phase of unification in action.

This was the

Outlined are the

variable contributions of these IGOs to the integration
process.

Specific focus is given to the EC.

Each branch

is examined to reveal exactly how it approached television
and how its actions affected integration.
Marketplace activities are surveyed from the
development of television through the introduction of
satellite communications.

This represented stage three of

Etzioni's model in which greater integration took place in
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various sectors of Europe,

as increased unification was

achieved in more sectors.
Finally,

an evaluation of the fourth stage in

Etzioni's model as related to the television industry in
Europe in 1987 is given.

Indicators will be identified to

measure the progress of integration, the impact television
policy had on integration activities,

and the proof of the

thesis and alternative scenarios.
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CHAPTER TWO
EUROPEAN TELEVISION AND
THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION

Since the beginning of recorded history, Europe had
been a geographical territory encompassing many groups of
people. They developed seme shared customs and traditions,
yet remained separated by language differences and by
national,

local, or regional customs and traditions.

While

people worldwide understood what it meant to be "European,"
Europe had never truly been united as a political entity.
The concept of a unified Europe inspired many
distinguished writers, philosophers, historians, social
scientists,

and politicians throughout history.

Voltaire,

in the 18th century,

wrote that Europe might be considered

"one great republic,

divided into several states."1

Rousseau wrote that "today there are no more French,
Germans,

Spaniards, or even English.

Europeans.

All have the same tastes,

the same way of life."2

. . There are only
the same passions,

In the nineteenth century, Victor

1 Cited in Denis de Rougement, The Idea of E u r o p e ,
trans. by Norbert Guterman (New York:
Meridian Books,
1968), p. 148.
2 I b i d . , p. 54.
14
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Hugo wrote,

"In the twentieth century there will be an

extraordinary nation.

. . It will be called Europe."3

Since the tine of the Greek and Roman Empires, Europeans
significantly influenced the world's economic and political
life.

At one time or other between the fifteenth and

twentieth centuries, Europeans colonized and controlled
vast parts of North and South America, Africa, Asia, as
well as Australia and many of the world's islands.
European nations expanded their kingdoms and empires while
retaining unique rivalries and alliances.

But after World

War II these nations were no longer able to play a dominant
role in world political, military, or economic spheres.
Many Europeans believed that Europe could regain
initiative and become a major force in the world again by
pooling the resources, peoples,

and power of its nations.

Leaders sought ways to increase a sensitivity to the
interdependence of all Europeans and to develop combined
European attitudes toward international issues.
diplomat,

French

Jean Monnet, perhaps the most influential

advocate of European unification,

argued that only through

greater political and economic unity could Europe escape
future wars and fulfill its potential in the world.4
Efforts by Monnet and others such as Winston Churchill and

3 Ibi d . , p. 265.
4 Jean Monnet, M e m o i r s , trans. Richard Mayne
City, N . Y . : Doubleday and Company, 1978), p. 272.

(Garden
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French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman,

led to the

establishment of organizations such as the Council of
Europe and the EC, which fostered unified European
discussions of major concerns and solutions to a wide range
of problems.
By the 1980s, the nations of Western Europe had
achieved considerable progress toward unification.

The

continent was no longer dominated by the bitter rivalries
and fragile alliances that had distinguished the region for
centuries.

In contrast, its nations were combining efforts

in many notable ways.

For example,

they had formed the

w o r l d ’s largest trading partnership.3

Europe spoke with

one voice in many forums throughout the world in matters
relative to trade,
policy.

technological standards,

and monetary

Nations within the EC often negotiated as a unit,

and the EC itself maintained embassies wor?.dwide.
significant extent,

To a

these nations had become a common

market and a unified force.

Europeans proved that when

they worked together as a unit and pooled their resources,
they had an impact on the world that separately they could
not have.

The general public throughout Europe also

recognized the positive contributions of a unified Europe.
In 1987,
Rome,

thirty years after the signing of the Treaties of

a public opinion poll found that most Europeans in

5 Commission of the European Communities, EUR 12:
Diagrams of the Enlarged Community, 1986, p. 12.
"Happy
Birthday," The Economist, March 21, 1987, p. 67.
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member-nations believed EC membership was good for their
country.

Furthermore,

the majority also believed that the

best way of preserving "national, cultural, historical
identities" as well as the "national economic interests
against the

[challenges of the U.S.,

Japan, was]

for the countries of Europe to become truly

united."

the Soviet Union, and

People in every member-nation embraced

unification as the best course that could be taken for
E u r o p e ’s future.6

Yet,

the inability of European

governments to support the Europa project demonstrated that
national governments could resist or ignore undertakings at
their discretion,

even if these efforts were undertaken to

better Europe as a whole and were backed by E u r o p e 's
leading IGOs.

They had achieved D e u t s c h ’s broad definition

of integration because they had demonstrated agreement that
"common social problems must and can be resolved by
processes of peaceful change.”7
some shifting of "loyalties,

But while there had been

expectations,

and political

activities" toward European centers, by Haas' definition
these traits had not shifted to a "new center, whose
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the p re
existing national states."8

Europe,

National governments retained

6 "Poll Shows Popular Support of European Union,"
May 1987, pp. 28-29.
7Deutsch,

Political Community, p. 5.

8 H a a s , The U n i t i n g , p. 16.
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jurisdiction over television policy.

They appeared to be

acting more like one of Etzioni's political systems with
their activities interrelated rather than integrated.9
While IGOs such as the EC intended to create a market
"without frontiers,"10 nations retained ultimate
sovereignty and in matters such as television reserved the
right to resist pan-European efforts in favor of actions
that benefittea the nation.
Lord Cockfield and others recognized the important
place television had during this time in history.

To him,

it was a central factor in shaping the future of Europe.
As long as television remained under the control of
national governments and television policy was nationally
developed and administered, Europe would not achieve true
unification.11

To underscore the importance of television

to the Community, the EC declared 1988 "European Cinema and
Television Year."

Ripa di Meana explained that this

declaration was made because television played "a leading
role in drawing the European Community closer together and,
therefore,

in the construction of Europe."12

Television's impact was heightened by the

9Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 6-7.
10 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 1-5.
11 Lord Cockfield,

"E.C. Proposes Common Standards,"

p. 16.
1 2 "Europe to Celebrate Cinema and TV in 1988,"
Eu rope, May 1987, pp. 41-42.
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development of satellite communications which radically
altered the nature of the television industry.
satellite era,

In the pre

television signals were relayed in one of

three ways, all of which were able to be controlled by
national governments.

The first two were over-the-air

broadcast signals and microwave relays.

Both had ranges

that could be limited by the amount of power and other
attributes assigned by the national governments.

The third

was cable television, which was totally regulated by each
national government.13

However,

communications by means of

satellites could not easily be confined to a limited
territory.

Once transmitted,

a satellite signal could be

received with equal clarity and immediacy throughout a
broad geographical area.

The only significant controlling

factor for satellite reception was the presence of proper
reception equipment.

Government control over reception of

satellite communications was limited to its ability to
regulate the availability of this reception equipment.14
Television played a role in Europe comparable to
the role communication played in other organizations.

This

process paralleled the activity that took place in society
when existing organizations merged.

In this application,

13 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 11-

21 .
edition
3-13.

14 Mark Lang, World Satellite Al m a n a c , Second
(Indianapolis:
Howard W. Sams and Co., 1987), pp.
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Europe was the organization to be created,

and television

was the communications medium for relaying information.
Conveying information accurately,

effectively,

and in a

timely manner, was vital to the health of an organization
by those who studied organizational behavior.19

The

character of communication exposed the genuine conditions
within an organization.

Ineffective communication or

significant gaps in intraorganizational communication were
symptomatic of deeper problems and pointed to deficiencies
in the nature of internal relationships.16

The result of

these deficiencies often was fragmentation, disunity, and a
lack of cohesiveness.

These factors prohibited the kind of

coordination required for growth and full development.17
Integration theorists agreed that communication
was vital to the integration process.
example,

Deutsch,

for

concluded that communication helped cultivate the

"unifying habits and institutions" necessary for
integration.

People depended on "mutual communication and

predictability" to avoid threats and develop an ability to
"depend on each other" and "view each other as partners
rather than as threats."

Deutsch viewed communication as

19 Fred Luthans, Organizational Behavior
McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 205.

York:

Society

(New York:

16 Douglas McGregor, The Professional Manager
McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 151.

(New

17 Peter F. Drucker, Technology Management and
(New York:
Harper Colophon Books, 1977), p. 23.
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central to the existence of a "people,” which he defined as
"a community of shared meanings," or a group who shared
habits of communication.

And while these habits most

often were formed among people with the same language, he
concluded that "sometimes the common culture and
communication habits, which make a people, may even spread
to form a nation among groups that speak different
languages."

Thus to Deutsch the problem that many

languages were spoken within a region did not present an
insurmountable obstacle to integration.

Deutsch also wrote

that the "processes of communication are the basis of the
coherence of societies,

cultures,

personalities of individuals."

and even of the

Communication facilitated

the experience of a common history and perspective on
events by a people, which helped unite them and give them
a more shared world view.18

A major characteristic of

membership in a group is "the ability to communicate more
effectively,

and over a wider range of subjects, with

members of one large group than with outsiders."19

Deutsch

also drew attention to Norbert Wiener's comment that
communication was "the cement that makes organizations.
Communication alone enables a group to think together,

to

18 Karl Deutsch, Political Community at the
International Level (New York:
Archon Books, 1970), pp.
13, 33, 41, 58.
19 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social
Communication (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1953), pp.
61, 70-71.
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see together, and to act together."20

Perhaps as much as

it played a role in the establishment and fostering of
integrated societies, the regulation or impeding of
communication in many cases prevented integration.
Communication patterns, habits, and activities could be
contained to a significant degree to sources within
national boundaries.

Such controls reenforced past or

existing loyalties and acted in some cases as barriers to
integration,

tending to limit interaction and prevent the

exchanges required to achieve integration.21

Etzioni

wrote that communication networks were indispensable for
organizations and became more important the larger and more
complex the organization.

Information had to flow

vertically through every level as well as horizontally from
one part of the organization to another.
Television proved to be an important communications
medium for Europe.

Nation-states and European IGOs both

sought increased jurisdiction over television policy.

For

the most part, television policy control remained with
national governments.

As the EP concluded,

tended to reenforce national allegiances.

these controls
Citizens watched

television programs produced or selected by and telecast

2 0 Cybernetics, cited in James E. Dougherty and
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of
International Relations, 2nd ed. (New York:
Harper and
Row, 1981), p. 424.
21Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 74.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
from organizations within that nation.

They listened to

radio programs and read books, newspapers, and magazines
originating in their nation.

The focus centered on

national life, and perspectives developed within that
framework.

These communication activities created the

"unifying habits and institutions" Deutsch used to
describe the integration process.22

But since the focus of

these habits and institutions was the nation,

these

activities reenforced national rather than European
integration.

While the nation-states of Europe enjoyed

unity through their internal communication, nationally
controlled television prevented continental integration
efforts.

They,

in fact, established the communications

barriers to integration to which Deutsch referred.23
Those,

such as the EC, who sought a European consciousness

and integration realized that this system had to be changed
and these barriers broken if Europe was to be unified.
Thus both those desiring to retain national sovereignty and
those desiring greater integration recognized the
importance television had on life in Europe.
As a communications medium,

television had

demonstrated the ability to influence the nature of society
itself.

The power of this medium was observed by many

noted analysts of trends in society.

Marshall McLuhan, one

22Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.
2

aDeutsch, N ationalism, p. 74.
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of the most influential analysts of communications,
concluded that the introduction of television to society
changed the way people acted and related to each other.

It

was a communications medium that affected nations and
cultures and changed the character of organizations
because it changed the relationships of people.24
In explaining why television was deemed of such
importance to society,

futurist Alvin Toffler, one of the

most widely read thinkers of the 1970s and 1980s, pointed
to the role it played in creating every p e r s o n ’s images of
reality.

Images were formed "out of the signals of

information reaching us" from every part of the
environment,

including the mass media.

environment changed,

When this

image formation was modified.

Changes

in communications media during the twentieth century
significantly altered the way these images were formed.23
The introduction of new communications technology
transformed the role of communications in society and with
these changes altered modern culture itself.26

Toffler

identified three primary waves in the development of
communications technology.

The first encompassed the

24 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media
Signet Books, 1964), p. 152.
23 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave
Morrow and Company, 1980), p. 145.

Books,

26Alvin Toffler, Future Shock
1970), pp. 280-2.

(New York:

(New York:

(New York:

William

Bantom
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years before mass media were developed when a limited range
of input such as neighbors,

family, oral history, and

personal experiences shaped world images.

The second wave

incorporated the development of the mass media.

The

creation of images was freed from dependence on the
immediate environment since books, newspapers, magazines,
radio, and television expanded the signals reaching people.
In Europe,

these media were usually oriented toward local

or national perspectives, reenforcing models of reality
centered on nation-states.

The third wave was shaped by

the introduction of such innovations as computers, video
and audio tapes,

cable television,

and satellites.

These

innovations altered the way images were formed and resulted
in increased choices for the individual.

With more sources

available, people could select information and
entertainment that satisfied their individual interests and
standards.

While during the second wave Europeans received

images influenced by nationally-oriented mass media,

images

in the third wave were received from an increasing number
of sources from throughout the continent.

The advent of

the third wave came while people who had grown up during
the second wave held dominant governmental positions in
Europe.
people,

The changing media environment affected these
as they yearned for the "ideological certainties of

the past" and were "annoyed and disoriented by the
information blitz of the new era."

These people wanted to
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retain the controls and certainty of the past, and resisted
changes brought on by the third wave.

This meant that

national governments attempted to maintain the same level
of control over media as they had before satellites.27
Other studies confirmed the importance of
television to modern society.

For example, John Naisbitt,

in his influential book, Megatrends. described western
civilization's shift from an industrial base to a society
primarily based on information.

This shift began in 1956,

the first year more Americans were employed in the
information sector rather than in the production of goods.
Naisbitt pointed to 1957 as "the beginning of the
globalization of the information revolution," when the
Soviet Union launched Sputnik I.

This also was the year in

which the EC was founded, reflecting Europe's participation
in the shift to more global perspectives.

Expanding on

McLuhan's belief that television would lead to "the global
village," Naisbitt predicted that it would be the marriage
of television with satellite technology that would lead to
this era.

Satellite television, with its capability to

relay messages to vast areas of the world with
unprecedented immediacy and quality,

created the potential

for vast socioeconomical and political change.28

27Toffler, The Third W a v e , pp. 145-154.

Books,

28 John Naisbitt, Megatrends
1982), pp. 12-13.

(New York:

Warner
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One of the leading theorists on global trends in
business. Harvard Professor Theodore Levitt, believed that
developments in communications technologies were primary
causes of changes in the structure of business as well as
society in general.

Hass communications pressured

established market segments and national controls in
Europe,

resulting in expanded consumer awareness and

increased demand for diverse products.

In spite of this

pressure, European nations through the mid-1980s
maintained tight controls over radio and television
s ignals.

Yet Levitt predicted that national governments

were fighting a losing battle.

He concluded that "in the

past barriers against superior technologies and better
economics have always fallen," and that the superior
technology of mass communications, particularly television,
would result in a more integrated European market.29
Television demonstrated the power to influence the
relationships of people to each other.

While nation-states

exercised considerable control over television before the
satellite era,
medium.

satellites introduced a new dimension to the

Fulfilling part of Haas* definition of

integration,30 satellite television became an environmental
factor that helped shift the expectations of Europeans

York:

29Theodore Levitt, The Marketing Imagination
The Free Press, 1985), pp. 20, 31-32.

(New

30Haas, The U n i t i n g , p. 16.
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toward centers outside of their own nation.

It also

created greater interdependence among peoples and market
segments throughout Europe,

as Etzioni contended would take

place in the first phase of unification.

Television,

particularly through satellites, offered the means through
which communication throughout Europe could be more
integrated,

in turn leading to a more integrated Europe.
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CHAPTER III
TELEVISION AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS:
REENFORCING THE ANCIENT LOYALTIES

If communication developed the "unifying habits and
institutions" necessary for integration,1 nationallycontrolled television activities provided ample evidence
that the nations of Europe were more interested in
strengthening their own national integration than in
encouraging the unification of Europe.

They became aware

that television brought with it the power to change
relationships2 as well as to influence the nature of images
individuals formed toward politics,
fashion,

commercial products,

and other aspects of society.3

Therefore

television policy throughout Europe was developed along
national lines, with distinctive policies even in
neighboring countries.
Television service began in most European countries

deutsch.

Political Community, p. 33.

2McLuhan, Understanding M e d i a , p. 152
3Toffler, The Third W a v e , p. 145.

29
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in the decade between 1944 and 1954.

For example,

television service started in France in 1944, in the U.K.
in 1946, in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952, and in
Italy in 1953.

Strong government control and supervision

were constant in each nation, but the exact nature of this
control varied.

The following sections summarize the

development of television in each of the nations of western
Europe.

Austria
Austria had two television services, 0RF1 and 0RF2,
both operated by Osterreichischer Rundfunk
broadcasting authority.

(ORF), the state

Both stations carried advertising.

Austria encouraged the development of cable television,
particularly following 1977 when distribution of foreign
programs in the country was legalized.

It also

participated in the development of some pan-European
satellite communications projects.4

Belgium
Belgium had a television policy that reflected its
political status as a nation sharply divided over language.
A 1963 law established four regions to govern the country,
with the divisions based primarily on language differences.
The areas were those regions where the Flemish
Walloon

(Dutch),

(French), and German populations were concentrated,

“■Gray,

Cable Television, pp. 80-81.
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with the capital of Brussels given special status.9

While

all broadcasting was considered a public service with
national implications,

three separate institutions were

given jurisdiction over television policy:

Radio

T&l&vision Beige de la Communaut6 Culturell Frangaise
(RTBF)

for the Walloon community; Belgische Radio en

Televisie

(BRT) for the Flemish community;

and Belgisches

Rundfunk und Fernsehzentrum fur deutschsprachige Sendungen
(BRF) for the Germany community.

Each were public

corporations governed by a board of directors appointed by
the minister of cultural affairs for the appropriate
language group.

All finances were overseen by the

national government.

No advertising was permitted.

The

RTBF and BRF granted television time to private, non-profit
organizations which met the criteria established by law.6
Belgium had the highest penetration of cable
television households of any nation in Europe, with nearly
ninety percent of its households wired for cable
reception.7

However,

its policy of no advertising on

television meant that television services based elsewhere
in Europe that carried advertising were not permitted on
systems in Belgium.

Pressure mounted through the 1980s for

’Gray, Cable Telev i s i o n , p. 83.
6 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 74-75.
7 "Belgium:
the Programmers' Battlefield," Cable
and Satellite E u r o p e , September 1986, p. 15.
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Belgium to reverse this policy, particularly since it was
the home nation for the EC.

Belgium's intricate

governmental structure mandated that each language-centered
regional government had to approve new legal frameworks.8
In Flanders,

the process of new media law

development brought the region close to a new law in 1987.
The new policy called for a new Flemish commercial
television station with several restrictions in ownership
and program content.

Expressing a concern for the Flemish

and overall Belgium culture,

the new policy was to demand

that a significant percentage of television channels
carried on cable systems in the area be Flemish.9

Similar

action was expected in Walloonia with corresponding
protection for the Walloon culture. Progress toward a more
open commercial policy remained in study.10
Some satellite television services were allowed
into Belgium, but they had to agree to commit to program
production in Belgium through a minimum investment
arrangement administered by the government.11
Belgian television policies changed during the

8 "Belgium Stalls on Media Law," Cable and Satellite
E u r o p e , June 1985, p. 33.
9 "Government Moves on Flemish Private Channel,"
Cable and Satellite E x p r e s s , June 26, 1987, p. 4.
10"Programmers Battlefield," Cable and Satellite
E u rope, June 1985, p. 15.
11 Ibid.
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1980s, but the country's political and social climate
continued to dominate television policy.

The divisions and

conflicts between the Flemish and Walloon areas in
particular overshadowed most other political activities.
Belgians seemed to be more concerned about the protection
of their own cultures than with encouraging television
services from other nations, or with television activities
that might encourage European integration.

Denmark
Denmark was one of the staunch advocates of
government monopoly over television activities.

Danmarks

Radio had the exclusive rights to television distribution
in Denmark,

and was Denmark's only television service.

advertising was prohibited.12

However,

All

after many years of

intense debate this situation changed in early 1986.

At

that time the Danish government approved the creation of a
new television station, which was to be supported by
advertising.

The new station was to be overseen by a five-

member board selected by the Danish Ministry of Culture,
which intended to maintain a public service focus rather
than allow the station to become focused on the
presentation of entertainment programs.13
Other changes were also made in a modest

12 Commission,

Television Without Frontiers, p. 98.

13 Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Denmark,"
Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , June 1986, p. 20.
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liberalization program.

In early 1987, the Danish

government for the first time approved the reception of
satellite television services by cable systems in Denmark.
This was part of Denmark's on-going effort to provide
extensive cable service throughout the country.

It was

projected that by the early 1990s 80 percent of Danish
households would have cable television.14
Denmark was typical of the nations of Europe which
reluctantly embraced satellite television.

It opened its

borders to satellite services and endorsed advertising as a
legitimate form of supporting television service only after
years of resistance.

Yet, Denmark remained concerned about

protecting its culture,

and maintain a cautious approach to

the introduction of new services and the approval of
advertising.

Finland
Finland's state broadcasting company, Oy Yleisradio
(Y L E ) , owned and operated two television stations, YLE-1
and YLE-2, both supported by subscriptions.

YLE leased

time to an independent company, Oy Mainos TV Reklam Ab
(MTV), which aired advertising-backed programs.

A third

channel was started in 1986 as a joint venture between YLE
and MTV.

More than half of the homes in Finland were

connected to master antennae

(MATV) system.

In MATV set-

1 4 "Denmark Opens Up," Cable and Satellite Ex p r e s s ,
April 3, 1987, p. 1.
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ups, one master antennae received programming from
television services and then transmitted the signals
through cables to dwelling units for viewing in individual
households.

Cable television was also encouraged.

Reception of satellite television from other nations and
purchase of home satellite dishes were allowed with few
restrictions.19

Finland was a minor partner with Sweden

and Norway in a direct broadcast satellite

(DBS) project

called Tele-X which was conceived as a means of providing
television service to the remote populations throughout the
region.

However,

its involvement was tempered by concern

about the Soviet Union.

Finland desired to stay on good

terms with this giant neighbor,
cautiously with

and therefore proceeded

commercial and satellite television

proje c t s .16

France
The 1980s were a time of challenge and change for
the mass media in France.
television service,

Since the inception of official

television had been a state monopoly,

and as such was accused of being used, often blatantly,
the ruling government for its own ends.
once said,

Media:

by

Charles de Gaulle

"My opponents have much of the press on their

13 Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Finish New
On Ice?," Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , June 1986, p.

22.
16 T a y l o r , "Battle," pp.

32-33.
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side, so I keep television."
Pompidou,

His successor, Georges

also expressed the view that television was

important not just as a political instrument but also as a
resource for the preservation of French culture.

He said,

"French television is the Voice of France," and wanted to
retain as much control of it as possible.17
The organization responsible for television between
1964 and 1974,
Frangaise
strikes,

the Office de Radiodiffusion-T616vision

(ORTF), was often charged with bias,

subjected to

and in 1974 was replaced by seven more independent

companies financed by the state:
casting programming

four overseeing broad

(three for television programs and one

for ra d i o ) ; the Soci6t6 Frangaise de Production

(respon

sible for all radio and television production); the
Institut de 1'Audiovisual

(for training of professionals

for audio-visual w o r k ) ; and T61&diffusion de France or TDF.
TDF provided general oversight of all broadcasting activi
ties.

However,

this arrangement did not end complaints.

Groups and individuals from all political philosophies
levied attacks on government control.18
After the election of Socialist Frangois Mitterrand
as President in 1981, French media policies changed.
audiovisual law, passed in 1982,

A new

established a nine-member

17Roger Williams, "France:
A Revolution in the
Making," Chann e l s , September 1985, p. 60.
18 Gray,

Cable T e levision, p. 97.
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supervisory group,

the Haute Autorit£,

broadcasting activities.

to oversee all

This structure,

however, was

subject to the same criticisms of political favoritism as
previous p r o c e d u r e s .19
TDF itself,

as a public corporation, was governed

by a sixteen member board,

including representatives from

Parliament and the High Authority for Audio-Visual
Communications.

The three networks overseen by TDF were:

T§16vision Frangaise 1 (TF 1), Antenne 2
R6gions 3 (FR 3).

(A 2), and France-

A separate organization,

the R6gie

Frangaise de Publicity

(RFP), attracted advertising and

produced commer c i a l s .

Slightly more than half of RFP was

owned by the government,

with the remainder owned by

representatives of the advertising industry,
consumers,

the press,

and another French state holding company,

Soci6t§ Financi^re de Radiodiffusion,
less of claims of independence,

or Sofirad.

the

Regard

representatives of the

state were involved in each of these organizations, provid
ing state direction, both subtle and direct.20
Mitterrand led France into the era of pay tele
vision by approving the development of Canal Plus,
scription television

a sub

(STV) service delivered via micro

waves to dwelling units paying for descrambling equipment.

19 I b i d ., p. 98.
20 Commission,

Television Without F r o ntiers, pp.

91.
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But one of the biggest surprises of his government came in
May of 1985, when Prime Minister Laurent Fabius announced
that France was going to embrace private television, with
expanded advertising acceptability, new national services,
and sixty-two local services.21

The new national services

were to be called La Cinq, TV6, and TV7.22
More furor was created in November 1985 when the
government awarded the license for La Cinq to a conglo
merate controlled by Italian media mogul Silvio Berlusconi
and French industrialist J6rome Seydoux.
British media multi-millionaire,

In addition,

Robert Maxwell was given a

license to operate an English-language service on the high
powered TDF-1 satellite France was developing.
neously,

Simulta

the government refused to honor a commitment it

had previously made to award a transponder on this satel
lite to Luxembourg's CLT.

Within the same week,

a bill was

pushed through a sparsely attended National Assembly which
allowed the government to use the Eifel Tower and other
buildings for television transmission purposes.
infuriated Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac,

This bill

a political

adversary and ideological opposite of Mitterrand.23

2 1 "French TV Begins to Take New Shape," Cable and
Satellite Ex p r e s s , May 31, 1985, p. 16.

22 Claire Wilson, "Crisis Looms Over French TV,"
Advertising A g e , March 10, 1986, p. 56.
2 3 "Political Furor Sweeping France," Var i e t y ,
November 27, 1985, pp. 121, 135.
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Television policy became one of the major issues of
the French elections of 1986, and continued as a major
political matter following the election when Chirac became
prime minister, setting up an unprecedented scenario in
France— a Socialist president, Mitterrand, had a
Conservative prime minister,

Chirac.

One of the first

actions of C h i r a c 's government was to cancel franchises
awarded for TDF-1 transponders,

and establish a new,

independent organization, called the CNCL, to oversee the
implementation of private television in France.
1986,

In July

the government revoked the licenses given to La Cinq

and T V 6 .

However,

a new communications bill was debated

throughout 1986, and the outcome remained clouded by
continuing uncertainty, as well as shifting political and
market forces.24

In spite of this on-going turmoil, France

continued to develop its TDF-1 high powered satellite
project, which was to have been launched in 1986, but was
delayed for technical and financial reasons.

Early in

1987, Finance Minister Alain Juppe concluded that TDF-1 was
too expensive to launch and operate.

Since this project

was developed in cooperation with West Germany, concerns
were raised about the consequences of delaying the project.
Eventually its continued development was approved.23

2 4 "Compromises on French Media Law," Cable and
Satellite E u r o p e , August 1986, p. 5.
2 s"Political Storm Brewing for TDF," Cable and
Satellite E u r o p e , March 1987, p. 8.
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To add to this complex domestic television
environment,

in 1985 two EP members took the French

government into the European Court of Justice on the charge
that French media laws violated the Treaty of Rome, which
established the EC.26
The French were one of the most visible and vocal
participants in the development of European IGOs and
projects for the strengthening of Europe's position in
international political and economical spheres.

They were

a leading force in the evolution of pan-European television
activity as well.

But French television policies were

marked by lingering internal political disputes,
television policies changed several times.

and their

They also

seemed to remain more concerned about protecting their
culture and language than advancing European integration
through television.

Federal Republic of Germany
Like Belgium,
Germany)

the Federal Republic of Germany

(West

took a regional approach to television policy in

conformation with its federal system of government. Author
ity for German television policy was designated specifi
cally to the eleven Lander, or states.
together with other Lander,

Acting alone or

the government of each Land

assigned responsibility for broadcasting within its region

2 6 "EEC Attacks French Media Law," Cable and
Satellite E u r o p e , September 1985, p. 6.
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to a non-profit public corporation.

Nine regional tele

vision stations were established, with a tenth— Zweites
Deutsches Fernsehen
among the states.

(ZDF)— established under an agreement
Each station was independent, with

limited government supervision.

They were managed by

broadcasting and administrative boards which included
representatives of the major political, religious,

and

philosophical groups in the state.27
West Germany designated three channels for use by
its individual stations.

Channel One was a national

service conducted as a joint venture among the nine
regional stations.

Its programming consisted of a mix of

programs from individual stations coordinated by the
association of public broadcasting corporations
broadcasted on Channel Two.

(ARD).

ZDF

Channel Three was dedicated to

broadcasts of five different regional services.28
This regional organizational structure was created
following World War II and was designed to prevent the
domination of Germany by one person or group,
the National Socialists had done.

as Hitler and

While this structure

prevented political dominance by one group,

it also pre

vented or limited the development and implementation of
national television policies,

and delayed German partici

27 C o m m i s s i o n , Television Without Fr o n t i e r s , pp. 9495.
2 8 I b i d ., p. 95.
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pation in the satellite television explosion of the 1980s.
While Lander control remained in effect for television,
national post office

(or Bundespost)

the

retained a monopoly on

the installation of cable television as well as all post
and telecommunications services.29
This complicated arrangement caused numerous
attempts to work out new ways to approach the issue of
satellite television within West Germany.

Years of nego

tiations resulted in a new treaty signed on April 3, 1987,
by the media representatives of each Land.

The treaty

provided for the creation of private television in West
Germany,

to coexist with public television.

Yet Germany

remained a long way from achieving a fully integrated
policy toward television.30
In the face of these internal obstacles, West
Germany remained active in the creation of a new satellite
service for Europe.

In a joint project with France,

the

Germans planned to launch a service called TV-SAT, with a
satellite technology duplicating France's projected TDF-1
satellite.

The German satellite was scheduled to beam

programming in German to Germany and was not designed to
reach the greater European market.31

29Gray,

Cable T e levision, p. 106.

3 0 "Media Treaty Signed," Cable and Satellite
E xpress, Vol. 4, No. 7, p. 4.
31 Chapman, New M e d i a , p. 17.
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Although West Germany became Europe's strongest
economic power after World War II, its own governmental
fragmentation within its federal system significantly
contributed to its slow growth in cable television as well
as to its inability to take a leadership role in tele
vision.

In contrast to such smaller countries as

Luxembourg and the Netherlands, West Germany had such
complex media regulations that it had not played as
significant a role as one would assume from a nation of its
size and economic clout.

Germans,

in a sense, spent their

energies on being integrated in their own nation and were
not concerned about the problems of European integration
through satellite communications.

Greece
According to the Greek Constitution of 1975, tele
vision was "under the immediate control of the State."
This provision was made to assure news and information
reports that were impartial by the government’s standards,
and to assure that program quality and content were in line
with the "social mission and the cultural development of
the country."

This policy was in accord with the Greek

g o vernment’s socialist orientation.

Greek law established

two organizations to operate television stations:
Radiophonia Tileorasses

Elliniki

(ERT 1 -Greek Radio and Television)

and Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassis

(ERT 2).

ERT 1 was

financed by a broadcasting fee levied on all television
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sets and advertising, while ERT 2 was funded from the
national budget and through advertising.

The board of

directors of ERT 1 consisted of seven members appointed by
the cabinet, while ERT 2 was managed by a five member board
appointed by the Ministry of the Presidency.32

Greece was

not active in the development of cable television and did
not play a major role in pan-European satellite efforts.

Ireland
Ireland's national broadcasting organization, Radio
Telefis Eireann

(RTE), was the only organization licensed

for television service in Ireland by its Minister for Posts
and Telegraphs.

It operated two television stations

and R T E - 2 ) , both of which accepted advertising.

(RTE-1

Advertis

ing accounted for slightly less than half of its revenues.
RTE also received substantial funding from the Irish
Parliament out of funds designated for the Ministry.

The

authority for the RTE was vested in a nine-member board
appointed by the government.33
Cable television installations increased during the
early 1980s.

However, most of the cable systems were

capable of receiving only six channels,

and those six

channels were almost exclusively reserved for BBC-1,

BBC-2,

32Commission, T elevision Without Frontiers, pp.
101-3.
33 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 8687.
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and Channel Four from the U.K., Ulster TV from Northern
Ireland,

and RTE-1 and RTE-2.

Few of Ireland's cabled

households received any of the satellite television
networks,

and major rebuilding of the cable systems was

required for this situation to change.34
In spite of its relatively small size, Ireland took
steps to become one of Europe's most advanced telecommuni
cations centers in the 1980s.

In December 1986,

its

government approved the construction of the Eiresat satel
lite system.

Eiresat was to be a high-powered satellite

with five channels capable of being seen throughout
Ireland,

the U.K.,

and the western part of continental

Europe.

The satellite was also to be used by the RTE.33

Ireland determined to enter the satellite era in an
aggressive way.36

Italy
Frequent leadership changes and corresponding
shifts in national policy were characteristic of post World
War II Italy.

Television policy was no less unstable.

Yet

by the mid-1980s, while the rest of Europe only gradually
expanded the number of available television services and
studied increased television privitization,

34 O'Connor,

Italy had more

"Ireland,” p. 29.

33Lang, World Satellite A l m a n a c , pp. 229-30.
36 Vanessa O'Connor, "Ireland's Satellite Jig,"
Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , August 1986, pp. 28-29.
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than 600 television stations, most of which were private.
Prior to the 1970s, Radiotelevisione Italians

(RAI)

monopolized airwaves with its state-owned public service
programming.

However,

on April 30, 1971, a local cable

network began operating in the small, northwestern Italy
city of Biella.

In the next few years, other networks

began similar operations elsewhere in Italy.

In 1974 the

Italian minister of communication ruled these networks
illegal, but in July of that year the Constitutional Court
of Italy decreed them legal.

In 1976 the court extended

this freedom of operation to over-the-air, broadcasting
stations,
services.

spawning a massive growth in available television
Due in part to the many changes in government,

no media law was passed to take the place of the one re
jected by the court in 1974.

Most of the 600-plus

stations attracted compar atively small audiences,
three RAI stations, RAI One, RAI Two,

and the

and RAI Three,

remained the only official national television services.
In 1980 Silvio Berlusconi started the first of his
"national networks" through distribution of videocassettes
to stations throughout Italy.
networks:

Canale Cinque,

By 1986 he had amassed three

Italia Uno, and Retequattro.

Other networks were created through similar packaging of
local stations,
and Video Music.

principal among which were Euro-TV,

Rete A,

Tele Monte Carlo from Monaco was allowed

to be telecast in Italy through special arrangement with
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the Italian government.37
A legal battle continued in Italy based on RAI's
legal position as the "only legitimate operator of national
broadcasting,” a definition affirmed by the Constitutional
Court in 1981.38

The court ruled that other organizations

could not create national networks,

and in 1984 a Turin

judge ruled that the networks operated by Berlusconi were
violating the law.

These networks were allowed to continue

operations at least until appeals could be filed.
holding company,
Industriale

A state

Instituto per la Ricostruzione

(IRI), held 99.55% of all RAI shares.

Adver

tising since 1972 was the responsibility of the Societa
Publicita Radiofonica e Televisiva
profit-making public company.

(SIPRA), wnich was a

Government monopoly of

national television service was justified due to the need
to provide "essential public service of pre-eminent general
interest."

However,

the ministry for posts and telecom

munications was ordered to grant licenses with only three
major stipulations:

(1) advertising could not exceed five

percent of total airtime;

(2) local stations could not be

linked into national"networks; and

(3) station operators

had to produce at least half of their own programs.39

3 7 "More Channels than D i s h e s ," Cable and Satellite
E u r o p e , August 1986, p. 13.
38Gray, Cable Television, p. 115.
39 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 6567.
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Italian television emphasized multiple consumer
choices before the dawn of the satellite era.

Court

actions in the 1970s created a deregulated environment,
resulting in the development of more stations than any
other nation in Europe.

However, some observers concluded

from the Italian experience that Europe must continue to
regulate television activities and that government controls
over television were needed.40

Luxembourg
Luxembourg, with a population of under 400,000 and
a territory of only 998 square miles, became one of the
most influential nations in Europe concerning television.
Much of its disproportional influence stemmed from its
government's approach to television.

Authority was given

to a public company, known as Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de
Telediffusion
profit.

(CLT), with a commission to make a financial

CLT did business under the name of Radio-Tele-

Luxembourg

(RTL).

RTL paid the Luxembourg government

levies based on its license fees as well as a fee for
continuing its status as a monopoly.41
Luxembourg was characterized by one observer as
Europe's "main

'offshore' TV broadcaster, beaming commer-

40 Jean-Marie Cavada, speech delivered at the
Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels,
October 16, 1986.
41 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 6364.
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cial TV and radio services into neighboring countries and
making its advertising money on the basis of foreign
audiences.”42

CLT had more freedom and authority than most

European broadcasting organizations.

In contrast to

countries like the Netherlands where broadcasting control
was vested in organizations concerned with preserving the
national culture,

CLT had primarily commercial aims.

Most

of its viewing audience came from Luxembourg's more
populated neighboring countries.

It programmed in the

Luxembourgian language only about an hour a day, otherwise
televising in French for its main RTL service and in German
for its RTL-Plus service.43
European,

Ownership of CLT was pan-

split among several private firms and

governmental g r o u p s , including the Soci6t6 G£n6rale de
Belgique, Agency Havas

(France), and the Banque

Internationale k Luxembourg.44
As a result of its more commercial,

less restric

tive approach to television,

Luxembourg had headquartered

several television ventures,

including CLT itself, with the

goal of broadcasting to audiences throughout Europe. In the
satellite era, Luxembourg became home to the Coronet

4 2 "Time of Reckoning for CLT," Cable and Satellite
E u r o p e , September 1986, p. 23.
43 C o mmission, Television Without F r o ntiers, pp. 6364.
4 4 "Reckoning," Cable and Satellite E u r o p e ,
September 1986, p. 23.
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project,

conceived in 1983, as the first private pan-

European satellite television service.

Coronet was

established in Luxembourg in part because the government
promised significant political and technical support.

The

Luxembourg government later took over more control of
Coronet through an organization called the Soci§t6
Europ&enne des Satellites

(SES).49

Coronet ceased to exist

in 1984, due to mounting costs and organizational diffi
culties.

However,

SES sustained the essence of this

concept in a project begun in 1985 called "Astra."

Astra

was backed by fourteen partners from throughout Europe
dedicated to private satellite-delivered television to the
continent.4 6
Ironically,

even though the government of

Luxembourg was involved in these independent v e n t u r e s , it
continued to support public pan-European television and
satellite enterprises.

But it was criticized for this

apparent double-mindedness.

L u xembourg’s sponsorship of

Coronet and Astra projects caused political trouble with
other European nations and IGOs.

It was publicly chastised

by Eutelsat, which claimed a monopoly on international
television distribution in Europe.47

Eutelsat President

4 3 I b i d . , p. 33.
4 6 Soci6t6 Europ6ene des Satellites, Sales brochure,
(Luxembourg:
SES, 1985).
47 Simon Lloyd, "Eutelsat Closes Ranks," Cable and
Satellite E u r o p e , August 1984, p. 10.
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Andrea Caruso called it "inconceivable that a government
with a strong commitment to Europeanism" like Luxembourg
could support such inde- pendent ventures.48
Differences in television policy caused conflicts
between Luxembourg and Prance as well.

A 1984 agreement

between the two countries assured the RTL two transponders
on a new satellite being developed by the French.49
However,

in 1986 that agreement was nullified by French

President Mitterrand, who awarded the transponders to other
organizations.

Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jacques Santer

said this "blatant" violation badly damaged "the spirit of
confidence" between the two countries.

The continuing

differences over television developments increased tensions
between these nations.30
In many ways Luxembourg embraced integration, but
its willingness to encourage private television ventures
indicated its continuing commitment to an independent
course in Europe.

Monaco
Even though Monaco occupied less than one square
mile of territory and had fewer than 30,000 inhabitants,

48Glyndwr Matthias, "The Monopoly Strikes Back,"
Cable and Satellite E u r o p e . March 1987, p. 40.
49 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 64.
" A l a n Osborn,
June 1986, p. 8.

"Dispute Over Airwaves," E u r o p e ,
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its broadcasting activities exercised influence throughout
Europe.

Radio Monte Carlo broadcast in more than twenty

languages and was heard throughout the world.
government-owned,

Its

commercial television station, Tele Monte

Carlo, was viewed by audiences in France and Italy, where
the governments authorized its reception.

Monaco was not

involved in any European satellite television developments.
Because of its unique tax and business climate,

it served a

role in southern Europe somewhat similar to Luxembourg's in
northern Europe as a haven for commercial broadcasting with
limited government interference and regulations.31

The Netherlands
Television in the Netherlands was controlled by the
Dutch Broadcasting Foundation

("Nederlandse Omroep

Stichting," or NOS), which was considered a public law
foundation, governed by a board of directors.

Half of the

board was appointed by private Dutch broadcasting organi
zations, with the other half split between appointees of
Dutch cultural organizations and the Dutch minister for
cultural affairs.

The NOS had to allocate television time

to broadcasting organizations, political parties,

and

religious organizations which met criteria in demonstrating
public demand for their programs.

When an organization

reached a certain level of memberships,

it qualified for

si"Foreign Broadcasting Chart,” Var i e t y , April 15,
1987, p. 150.
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air time.

Groups with larger membership bases received

more desirable air time.

Operations were financed by a mix

of license fees, contributions from broadcasting organi
zations,

and advertising, which was regulated by the

Foundation for Broadcast Advertising.32
Cable television in the Netherlands was legalized
in 1965.

From the beginning the Dutch sought to make cable

and broadcast television a servant of the public good,
rather than a source of profit.

To be cabled,

a community

had to demonstrate that at least 70 percent of its citizens
wanted cable television.

Local government municipalities

exercised a significant control over programming content as
well as operations of each cable system.33

For example,

51

percent of the 300,000 subscriber system in Amsterdam was
owned by the city of Amsterdam, with 48 percent owned by an
organization of local housing associations.34
Cable television systems in the Netherlands were
allowed to retransmit television programming services from
other European countries.

However,

to be carried on Dutch

cable systems, non-Dutch services had to comply with strict
standards.

Dutch laws prohibited the reception of tele

vision signals

(whether in the form of programs or adver

32 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 6970.
33 Gray,

Review

Cable Television, pp. 119-20.

34 Michael Chapman and David Wood, The New Media
(London:
Ogilvie and Mather, 1984), p. 22.
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tising) which were aimed exclusively at the Netherlands.
The goal of this policy was the protection of the Dutch
culture from outside influences.
review,

In 1984, after intense

the Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural

Affairs issued a revised policy document which summarized
revisions required because of technological developments
such as satellite communications and cable television.
This document outlined three fundamental tasks to which the
Dutch government was committed:
and diversity of its media;

(1) protecting the freedom

(2) protecting and increasing

the awareness of Dutch cultural achievements;

and

(3)

expanding the number of programming choices for the
consumer.3 3
While the government expressed its desire to
satisfy consumer demand for more choice,

this ranked lower

in priority than the protection of the Dutch media and
culture.

The government was dedicated to preserve the

Dutch way of life and to control television in order to
accomplish this.

It determined to protect everything "old

and deeply rooted" in its society worth saving and
revitalizing.

Commercialism could be increased to respond

to popular demand for increased programming choices.
However,

the government warned that technology must not be

allowed to rule society.

The government vowed to

33 Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural
Affairs, Policy Document on the Media (The Netherlands,
1984), p. 2.
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"guarantee protection of those values which,
of its other policies,

in the light

it does not wish to expose to

untrammeled social and technical development."
government,

To the

these values were more important than

commercial gain or blind acquiescence to pan-Europeanism.
Television was important to further Dutch culture and
events in European television were potential threats to the
health of this culture.

Overall Dutch "values,

firms and

products" lost ground to other influences and developments
"detrimental to our culture,
knowledge."

employment and store of

The Dutch vowed to fight this erosion through

financial and legal means that would aid Dutch companies
and individuals,

and its overall society.

This concern for

the protection of Dutch autonomy did not mean the closing
of Dutch frontiers, but the government warned that foreign
programmers would be required to comply with Dutch laws,
including the prohibition of advertising aimed at the
Netherlands.
point.

The government remained adamant on this

For them,

involvement in pan-European or regional

television ventures was conditional on the prohibition of
this kind of advertising and the protection of Dutch
cul t u r e .5 6
At the same time,

the Dutch remained active in the

development of pan-European satellite television.

They

were the host country for Europa and participated in other

3 6 I b i d ., pp. 10, 17-20.
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pan-European television undertakings.

They remained,

however, preeminently concerned about protecting their
culture and heritage,

apparently holding these in higher

regard than European integration.
commitments as contradictory.

Some saw these

For example,

Dutch EP

member, Gijs de Vries, argued successfully before the
European Court of Justice that Dutch protectionism violated
the Treaty of Rome which established the EC.

The Court

agreed with his argument and ordered the Dutch government
to change its media laws to comply with the

Treaty.37

This

and other challenges to Dutch policies were

forcing the

Netherlands to decide how much of their heritage and
tradition they were willing to forsake.

How willingly

would they conform to European standards instead of
protecting their own?

Their answer was to determine how

the Netherlands fit into Europe's future.

Norway
Norway had one of the most restrictive television
policies in Europe.

Its one television station operated

without advertising and had careful government oversight.
Yet Norway became a leader in the use of satellites to
bring television to its sparsely populated northern
region.38

Through its 15 percent ownership in the Tele-X

37 Cable and Satellite E u rope, June 1985, p. 23.
38 Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "The Norwegian
Picture," Cable and Satellite E u rope, June 1986, p. 16.
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DBS satellite project it developed with Sweden and Finland,
Norway hoped to expand its service to this remote
territory.59
The creation of a second television station and the
approval of advertising were subjects that were hotly
debated throughout the 1980s.

Socialists favored retaining

an advertising ban, while Conservatives sought expanded
commercialism and advertising on the broadcast media.
Overall, Norway remained cautious regarding television
expansion.

The government was aware that the nation

historically lived in the shadow of its more powerful
neighbors, principally Sweden.

While seeking practical

relations in various projects of the Scandinavian
countries, Norway was conservative in its media policies as
its way of preserving its culture and guarding against too
great an influence from Sweden and other countries.60

Portugal
Portugal joined the EC in 1986, ending years of
relative isolation from the rest of Europe.
always been state-owned and controlled,
advertising was permitted.
administrator,
2.

the RTVP,

Television had

although

The state's broadcasting

owned two stations, TVP-1 and TVP-

A proposal was before the government to allow private

59Doreen Taylor, "Battle in the Sky Over
Scandinavia," Broadcast, October 31, 1986, pp. 32-33.
60 Baker,

"Norwegian," p. 16.
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stations in the country.

It had not encouraged the devel

opment of cable television and did not actively pursue
satellite communications for Portugal.61

Spain
Spain emerged from decades of dominance by
Francisco Franco upon his death in 1975.

Television,

like

most other aspects of Spanish life, had been tightly
controlled by Franco's government.
King Juan Carlos,
outside world,

Spain opened new contacts with the

adopted a democratic constitution,

joined the EC.
television.

With the accession of

and

This liberalization carried over into

Most of the country received only two tele

vision channels,

each operated by Radiotelevision Espanola

(RTVE), Spain's state-owned broadcasting corporation.
Three stations were operated by the regional governments
Galicia,

the Basque country,

and Catalonia.

was permitted on all stations.62

Advertising

A new media law, approved

by Spain's Council of Ministers on April 3, 1987,
the development of private television in Spain.

allowed
The new

law prohibited any person or organization from owning more
than 25 percent of a network.63

6C h a p m a n ,

New M e d i a , p. 22.

Gray, Cable T V , p. 70.

6 2 "Marina Specht, "Lady of Spain," Electronic
M e d i a , April 20, 1987, pp. G3, G17.
63 Peter Besas, "Private TV in Spain Gets
V a r i e t y , April 15, 1987, p. 1.

'Okay',"
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Spain was not active in developing cable television
or utilizing satellite communications.

However, RTVE

director Pilar Miro pledged to increase Spanish programming
production and to foster new initiatives to upgrade tele
vision quality and standards.
program production,

She was committed to Spanish

concentrating on programs "that pre

serve our national cultural identity and our European
heritage."64

S p a i n ’s entry into the EC set in motion a new

openness and freedom for television.

Efforts made since

this entry demonstrated its willingness to change and adapt
to the new era of satellite communications.

Sweden
The Sveriges Radio AB
Corporation)
SVT-2.

(Swedish Broadcasting

controlled two television stations,

SVT-1 and

Both were financed by subscription license fees.63

With half of Swedish dwelling units formed into blocks of
flats, master antennae television systems

(MATV) owned by

local authorities or housing associations became
significant market factors.

These MATV operators developed

significant power in the Swedish television industry
because of the number of people subscribing to them.66

6 4 Specht,

"Lady," p. 63.

63 Foreign Broadcast Chart, V a r i e t y , April 15, 1987,
p. 150.
66 Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Sweden Sets
Pace," Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , June 1986, p. 15.
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The tradition of MATV influence was a factor in
several television-related activities in Sweden.
satellite receive dishes for hone use

More

(HTVRO, or television

receive only for home reception) were available in Sweden
than any other European nation.

The Swedish government had

one of the least restrictive policies in Europe for dish
ownership, which was a leading factor in HTVRO growth.
Televerket,

S w eden’s PTT,

also sought to encourage the

development cf cable television.

This development put

Televerket in direct competition with MATV operators for
television distribution to consumers.67
Sweden was a leader in the development of a direct
broadcast satellite
Tele-X.

(DBS) project for Scandinavia, called

Scheduled for launch in 1988.

this satellite was

owned by the governments of Sweden, Norway,

and Finland,

with Sweden's share being a dominant 82 percent.

Sweden's

development and backing of Tele-X was indicative of
Sweden's commitment to the development of satellite
television,

but its participation was primarily to serve

the Scandinavian community rather than the rest of
Europe.6 8
Considerable uncertainty surrounded Sweden’s
direction in broadcast television.

In the 1980s,

Sweden

considered adding another television station and approving

67 Ibid.
68 Taylor,

"Battle," pp.

32-33.
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advertising on all Swedish stations.

Sweden's strong

Socialist parties opposed this kind of commercialism, while
conservatives encouraged it.

In September 1987, the

Socialist party once again voted to continue the ban on
advertising.6 9

Switzerland
Although politically non-aligned and not part of
the EC, Switzerland was a vital part of western Europe's
television marketplace.
Corporation

The private Swiss Broadcasting

(SBC) was licensed by the government to direct

television and other broadcasting activities.
operated three services,
(German, French,

The SBC

one for each major language group

and Italian).

The Swiss PTT handled

program transmission and the collection of license fees
which financed the programming.70
Switzerland’s geographical location played a role
in shaping its approach to television.

Swiss received

television programs from neighboring France, Germany,
Italy.

and

It began developing cable television in the early

1960s primarily to improve television reception in
mountainous area.

Due to aggressive development of cable

television, more than half of the Swiss households were
connected to MATV systems.

Cable systems were licensed by

69 Jack Burton, "Swedes Rejecting TV Ads,"
Advertising A g e , October 5, 1987, p. 28.
70Gray,

Cable Television, p. 135.
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the PTT, which determined which satellite networks were
made available.71
A referendum was held in December 1984 concerning
television policy,

and as a result,

the government began to

consider proposals to create new stations and introduce
advertising on television.

While the Swiss people in

general expressed their desire for these changes, some
leaders voiced concerns on the impact of new television
services

(including satellite networks from other

countries)

on Swiss traditional values and way of life.72

The United Kingdom
Television in the U.K. operated under governmental
directives that dated back to 1926, when the British
Broadcasting Corporation
Secretary.

(BBC) was established by the Home

The BBC operated two networks

(BBC1 and BBC2)

and was supported by a tax on television sets in the U.K.
No advertising was allowed.
Broadcasting Authority
two networks:

In 1954,

the Independent

(IBA) was established.

ITV and Channel Four.

It operated

IBA programs were

produced by member stations located throughout the U.K.
Its networks were advertiser supported.73

71 Ibid.
7 2 "More Swiss Channels," Cable and Satellite
E u r o p e , April 1986, p. 27.

81.

73 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 79Gray, Cable T V , pp. 138-39.
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The BBC was under the direction of a board of
governors, whose members,

chairman,

and deputy chairman

were appointed by the Home Secretary.

It was required to

provide television programs "as a public service for
disseminating information, education,

and entertainment."74

This stable system and the high quality of programming
produced made British television much admired throughout
Europe and the world.

The consistent ability of the BBC

and IBA to provide entertainment and information programs
with variety and high standards was a key reason cable
television and DBS ventures did not attract significant
momentum in the U.K.

Several British pay television

services went bankrupt due to lack of subscribers and
viewers,

and high costs.

Cable television companies also

experienced financial difficulties.73
However,

the U.K. became the headquarters for

several of the most influential television networks of the
early satellite television era,
the SuperChannel.

including Sky Channel and

The success of these ventures,

coupled

with widespread availability of American programs in
Europe,

caused concern in other European nations.

Some

felt that pan-European satellite programming would become a
vehicle for English language dominance and that European
unity would mean establishment of English as the language

74 Commi s s i o n , Television Without Frontiers, p. 79.
7 3 Gray,

Cable T V . p. 139.
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The public in general seemed satisfied with the
quality of British television, but operational costs of
these services continued to increase.

The Thatcher

government commissioned a special committee under the
direction of Professor Alan Peacock to study the future of
television in the U.K., particularly the BBC.

The Peacock

Commission released its report in July 1986.

It called for

gradual changes in the financing of the BBC.

In the first

phase, a system like that in existence would continue.

But

in an effort to keep costs in line, budgets and expenses
would be indexed to inflation.

Funding would continue to

be based on the license fees fixed for each television set.
The second phase was to follow toward the end of the
century.

In this phase the BBC would become a subscription

service.

Its television signal would be encoded and

viewers would need to pay for proper equipment to receive
its programs.

The Commission recommended all television

sets sold or rented in the U.K. after 1988 be equipped for
encryption and that all restrictions for the reception of
pay services and programming from other EC nations and
removed.

be

The Commission report became the focal point for

the debate on the future of television in the U.K.77

76 Brenda Maddox, "Sky King," Channels,
January/February 1986, pp. 53-55.
77Glyndwr Matthias, "For the Birds?," Cable and
Satellite Europe, August 1986, pp. 36-37.
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Because of its tradition of high standards in
program production and service,

and because of the

encouragement of its government,

the U.K. became a leader

in the development of European television.

The most

successful pan-European television services were Englishlanguage services based there,

and many of the foremost

leaders in pan-European television were from the U.K.

The

government had not encouraged public spending in these
developments but had focused on the role of the private
sector.

Its actions in encouraging private ventures seemed

to guarantee a leadership role for the English language in
the development of European television.

Summary
This survey of television policies in eighteen
nations of western Europe recounts the individuality of
their approaches to television from the time of the
inauguration of television service in the 1940s and 1950s
through 1987.

Television was a state monopoly in France,

Spain, Belgium,

and Denmark.

The private sector was given

control in Ireland and Luxembourg, while in Italy,
the Netherlands,

Sweden,

and Switzerland, government and private

sectors shared control.

West Germany television operations

were financed and controlled by the Lander, while the U.K.
provided for separate public and private commercial
operations that existed side-by-side.

Some nations allowed

private television, while others prohibited it.

Some
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allowed advertising, but others banned it.
of these diverse approaches,

Yet in spite

strong controls exercised by

national governments remained the constant throughout the
European television industry.

However,

these policies

started changing in the 1980s, corresponding with the
introduction of satellite television.
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CHAPTER IV
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND TELEVISION IN EUROPE

Europeans emerged from World War II willing to
consider new approaches to their problems.

Several

cooperative organizations were formed in the hope that
nations could band together.

The United States encouraged

this effort through the Marshall Plan which in 1947
established the European Recovery Program

(ERP) providing

distribution of more than $12 billion in food, clothing,
economic aid, and other resources.

In 1948, the

Organization for European Economic Cooperation was
established to distribute these funds.

The OEEC provided a

forum for the nations of western Europe to meet together to
discuss economic issues and work together to develop
solutions for their problems.

In the years that followed

other I G O s , such as the Council of Europe and the EC, were
formed to provide other forums for cooperation among these
nations.
According to D e u t s c h ’s definition,

integration was

the process of creating "unifying habits and institu
tions."1

In post World War II Europe,

1Deutsch,

through the

Political Co m m u n i t y , p. 33.
67
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creation of such organizations, Europeans cane to work
together.

Their labors nay not always have been

harnonious, but nore unified habits and institutions were
produced through the fornation and operation of these
organizations.

At the tine of the foundation of such

organizations as the EC and the Council of Europe,
television was a developing technology and was not a
central issue.

However,

the growing inpact of television

in the comnunities of Europe and the introduction of new
technologies such as satellite comnunications and cable
television during the intervening years forced these older
organizations to apply their energies to developing
policies on television.

These IGOs were representative of

the second stage of E t z i o n i 's model of integration,
demonstrating the way that elite groups were formed to
coordinate the activities in the appropriate unit sector,
in this case,

television.

This chapter will examine major

IGOs which impacted the development of television or which
were concerned with television-related technologies.
addition,

In

other IGOs were established which addressed the

development of television and provided oversight to various
aspects of television activities in Europe.

Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was established on May 4,
1949.

It grew from an initial membership of ten nations to

twenty-one by 1987.

Its purpose was to achieve greater
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unity among member-nations, determine ways for its members
to work together to improve the economic and social life of
the people in member-nations, and uphold the principles of
democracy.

The Council’s executive functions were the

responsibility of a Committee of Ministers, made up of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs from each country.

Other

Council organizations included a Parliamentary Assembly
(which met once a yea r ) , a Secretariat,
Human Rights,

a Commission of

a Court of Human Rights, a Committee on the

Mass Media, and other committees.

Decisions by the

Committee of Ministers and the Court of Human Rights were
binding on all member-nations.

Because of this authority

and the gravity of the subjects it tackled,
Court judgments were made with caution.

Committee and

The Committee also

made non-binding recommendations.2
In 1984 the Council made several pronouncements
regarding television.

The first concerned advertising.

While agreeing that advertising should comply with laws of
the country transmitting the advertising, the Council
recommended that consideration should be given to the laws
in countries of reception as well.

This concern was to be

particularly evident in countries where a significant
proportion of a station or network's programs were seen.3

2Europa Yearbook 1 9 8 5 . "Council of Europe," pp.
131-133.
3 Elaine Couprie, "Transfrontier Television by
Satellite," Media Bulletin. March 1985, p. 11.
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In a second announcement, the Committee of
Ministers issued three principles:

(1) Satellite

television services had to comply with the laws in the
country transmitting the service.

(2) Program producers had

to abide by the European Convention on Human Rights,
guaranteeing that diverse opinions would be provided and
that audience privacy and moral concerns would be
respected.

(3) The right of reply or other appropriate

actions had to be guaranteed when television programs
crossed borders.4
In December 1986,

the Council held its first

minister-level conference exclusively dedicated to the mass
media in Europe.

As a result of this conference,

the

Council agreed to begin work on a legally binding
convention for television and other media.3

It also

decided that quotas mandating minimum levels of European
produced programs on European services would not be
recommended.

This action directly opposed the EC

Commission which proposed quotas in order to stimulate and
guarantee European television program production.

The

Council acknowledged the importance of production to the
culture,

industries,

and economies of Europe, but concluded

that quotas inadequately addressed this problem.6

4 Ibid.
3 Jack Kindred, "Pan-European Satellite TV
Regulations in the Works," Variety, December 17, 1986, p. 42.
6 Cable and Satellite E u rope, January 1987, p. 5.
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Early in 1987,

the Council proposed a regulation

prohibiting the transmission of advertising originating
from one country but aimed at an audience in another
country without the permission of the government of the
country of reception.

This reflected the attempt of the

Council to resolve the issue of television conflicts.7
The Council's importance to the television debate
was acknowledged by other European IGOs.
EC's Committee on Youth,

For example,

Culture, Education,

the

Information,

and Sport acknowledged that the EC was merely "part of the
free and democratic Europe associated within the Council of
Europe."

In this context,

EC actions were not taken in

isolation but brought the Community "in line with the
rulings of the European Court of Human Rights."

However,

the committee expressed concern that the Council was not
adequately addressing the problems with the situation in
Europe.

It also criticized the Council for its perceived

aim to "preserve and protect existing national markets as
far as possible" rather than create a common market
throughout Europe, which the committee believed should be
its goal.

In contrast,

an integrated market,

the EC was committed to encourage

not simply to break down

broadcasting barriers.8

7 "Council of Europe May Challenge Scan-Sat," Cable
and Satellite E u r o p e , June 1987, p. 6.
8 European Parliament,
Brussels, 1985, pp. 31-33.

Document WG(2)

1738E,
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The stature and authority of the Council of Europe
assured that its actions would influence the development of
television in Europe.

Actions it took during the 1980s to

address cross-border transmission and advertising were
indicative of its recognition of the need for resolution of
conflicts between European nations on the subject of
television.

European Broadcasting Union
The European Broadcasting Union

(EBU) was founded

in 1950 as an umbrella organization for broadcasting
organizations in Europe.

Its active and associate members

included more than 100 organizations.

Active membership

was limited to those directly involved in European
broadcasting while associate membership was open to
organizations elsewhere in the world.

The EBU assisted in

the development of all forms of broadcasting and supported
member interests.
administrative,
organizations.9

Its committees studied technical,

and legal problems for member
Its most visible contribution to European

television was its Eurovision service.

Conceived in 1954,

Eurovision was a television service provided to member
nations which included sporting and cultural events,
news.10

Having launched this part-time service,

and

the EBU

9Anne-Michele Eckstein, e d . , Television and New
Technology (Brussels:
European News Agency, 1986), pp. I.

1-2
10Europa Yearbook 1 9 8 5 , p. 244.
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had hoped to establish a television station that could
serve all Europe full-time.

Such a service would require

the cooperation of its members and provide television
programs that could be seen every day throughout Europe.
It tested this concept in 1982 with a service called
"Eurikon."

This test was backed by many of Europe's

largest broadcasting organizations.

The EBU felt

sufficiently satisfied with the test to develop the concept
further.

This project became known as "Europa" and began

daily transmission in 1985.

The EBU had received a

commitment from the European Space Agency

(ESA) for a free

transponder on a satellite it was to launch in the late
1980s.11

However,

lack of political and economic support,

inadequate distribution,

and greater than expected costs

led to the cancellation of Europa in 1986, before its new
satellite could be launched.

The EBU and other

organizations hoped to revive the project with
participation from more nations and with reception in more
European countries.12
To the EBU, television as well as all broadcasting
activity were part of the cultural and social life of every
nation.

Decisions regarding broadcasting were not to be

based on financial considerations or to be viewed from any

11 Simon Baker, "A Go-Ahead at Last," Cable and
Satellite E u r o p e , January 1985, pp. 20-21.
1 2 "Losses," Multichannel N e w s , p. 23
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perspective that would threaten national sovereignty.

An

approach based on economics alone might undermine national
organizations,

and change the nature of broadcasting in

Europe, which should not be encouraged.

The EBU agreed

with a German Federal Constitutional Court's opinion that
broadcasting organizations performed a 'public f u n ction,’
not merely an economic one.

Because of this perspective,

the EBU refused to approach television from the common
market perspective as favored by the EC.

The EBU viewed

efforts by the EC and others to develop a European media
policy as threats to national broadcasting laws and to the
health of television in Europe.

In the view of the EBU,

international television policies already were recognized
and in place through the World Administrative Radio
Conference

(WARC)— a group within the International

Telecommunications Union

(ITC).

Any actions by the EC,

the

EBU believed, would subvert the international broadcasting
system which was already in place and functioning,

and

which provided all the regulations that were necessary.13
The EBU recommended that no further activity in
developing a European television policy be undertaken
within the EC.

It also recommended that the new media

associated with satellite communications be allowed to
develop before attempts to form media policies be made.
With satellite technology still in the developmental stage,

13 Parliament, Document WG(2)

1738E, pp.

25-26.
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the EBU stressed the need to let the technology progress
with as few restrictions as possible.

Increased regula

tions at this stage might limit its evolution.

From its

point of view, actions by the EBU itself and the Council of
Europe were sufficient to protect broadcasting organiza
tions.

Nothing should be done to undermine either these

organizations or the control of television at the national
level.14

EBU's president would not even comment on the

1985 EC Conunission Green Paper on the Media.

He believed

media policy vas strictly a national consideration and
deferred comment to EBU member governments.
The EBU acknowledged a fragmentation within the
European television community,

and agreed on the urgency

for unified technical standards to eliminate waste and
inefficiency caused by the nations of Europe adopting their
own standards and systems.

In its view,

the EBU had been

working for years to end this fragmentation.

It believed

it already had much of the framework and mandate to rectify
problems in European television.

It urged support for its

efforts and systems, which were based on nearly 40 years of
involvement in European television,

rather than creating

new organizations or stimulating new efforts within other
organizations such as the EC.15

14 Ibid.
13 George Waters, speech to the Conference on the
Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 15, 1986.
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The actions and policies of the EBU demonstrated
the importance of television to Europe and the degree to
which differences existed regarding the direction European
television should take.

As the voice of E u r o p e ’s national

broadcasting organizations,

the EBU championed national

sovereignty and stressed that television questions should
remain within the jurisdiction of national governments and
international broadcasting organizations already in exist
ence.

While striving for harmonization and close communi

cations in programming and technical standards,

the EBU

championed national rights and sovereignty within a
cooperative European environment.

European Space Agency
The first pan-European space organization,
European Space Research Organization

the

(ESRO), was formed in

1972 to pool Europe's resources in order more efficiently
to develop an effective space program for participating
nations.

Within months,

several nations joined to form

the European Launcher Development Organization
develop E u r o p e ’s rocket launcher capability.

(ELDO), to
In 1975 ESRO

and ELDO were merged into the European Space Agency

(ESA).

France was the dominant member in ESA with 63.87 percent
ownership.

The remaining percentage was divided among nine

other nations,

the largest of which was West Germany.16

16 Allan Ward,

"Science Reaches Orbit," Space, pp.

3-4.
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ESA was the only European organization capable of
launching satellites,

the instrument by which satellite

television was relayed throughout the continent.

It

provided a forum for planning, national government
interaction,

and staying on the cutting edge of satellite

technology.

ESA also cooperated with other major IGOs in

Europe's utilization of space technology for television.

Intelsat
The International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization

(INTELSAT) was founded on August 20, 1964, to

establish the world's first global satellite communications
network.

By 1987,

Intelsat had 112 member-nations,

including all the major nations of Europe.

Intelsat

maintained a system of orbiting satellites as well as
support ground stations for signal reception and
distribution.17

Intelsat took on additional importance for

Europe because several satellite television services used
Intelsat satellites for distribution of their programming.
This usage was important in the development of satellite
television in Europe.

Intelsat promised to continue to be

important for Europe, primarily as a distribution system.

Eutelsat
European nations agreed that Intelsat played a
valuable role in international satellite development.

17 Lang, A l m a n a c , pp.

57-59.
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However,

they concluded that Europe needed to develop its

own satellite distribution system.

Therefore,

in 1977, the

European Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(EUTELSAT) was established.

Membership included 25 nations

by 1987, and was open to any country that was a member of
the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications
Administrations

(CEPT), the organization from which

Eutelsat received its most significant impetus.

Responsi

bility for membership in Eutelsat was with each membernation's P T T , the governmental department responsible for
post, telegraph,

telephone,

Originally,

and other related services.18

Eutelsat was created to supply

telephone, high-speed data transmissions, and Eurovision
transmissions from the EBU.

Prior to the launch of its

first satellite, Eutelsat FI, a television service,

later

renamed "Sky Channel," started transmitting on an Intelsat
satellite.

Cable systems throughout Europe started

carrying its programming.

Sky Channel's transmissions

moved to one of the U.K.'s transponders on FI after its
launch.

The impact of Sky Channel changed the nature of

Eutelsat's service,

and within one year of its launch FI

was used almost exclusively for program distribution from
satellite television services.19

Eutelsat maintained a

monopoly on telecommunications links

(including television

18 Ibid., pp. 117-19.
19 Ibid.
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signals)

relayed between countries of Europe.

Eutelsat

developed the technical systems for use in Europe, but
member PTTs or their designated representatives decided how
to use the systems provided.

Eutelsat satellites were

built and launched by the ESA.

Once functional, satellites

became Eutelsat responsibility.

Because demand for

satellites was great and available space initially was
limited,

a system had to be devised to award access to

satellites fairly.

Eutelsat determined that satellite use

would be allocated based on the size of contributions to
Eutelsat, with the larger nations getting the most
desirable allocations.

However,

its director and governing

board attempted to make these allocations as fair and
equitable as possible,

providing space for nations of all

sizes.20
Eutelsat and its director general, Andrea Caruso,
were vocal about the direction being taken for European
satellite systems.

Eutelsat strongly opposed the Coronet

and Astra projects developed by SES in Luxembourg.

Caruso

argued that the EC ratified the Eutelsat agreement which
gave it exclusive power to operate satellites in Europe.
Eutelsat opposed these projects for legal as well as
practical reasons.

Development of projects like Astra

weakened the Eutelsat system,

impairing all of its members

20 Conversation with Kr. Folkestad, Norwegian
Telecommunications Administration, and Hans Bratterud, New
World Channel, Oslo, March 8, 1985.
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by making the systems less efficient.

Caruso expressed

astonishment that the Luxembourg government could both
belong to Eutelsat and encourage the SES projects.

He

found it "inconceivable that a government with a strong
commitment to Europeanism,
support such a venture."21

such as L uxembourg's , could
Eutelsat believed its monopoly

power was needed for Europe to develop successfully its
satellite capability.

Caruso warned of the disastrous

consequences if there were no controls over satellite
development and utilization in Europe.

"If deregulation

takes place in European satellite telecommunications,
there will only be losers," he warned.

"There is not

enough demand for TV distribution and telecommunications
service here to support two competitive systems."
voice of the PTTs,

As the

Eutelsat supported the monopoly power

enjoyed by all PTTs,

as well as by Eutelsat itself.

Caruso predicted economic and social disorder if private
operators competed with government organizations.22
Eutelsat and SES resolved their differences in September
1987, when a compromise was announced by which Eutelsat
agreed to end its opposition to SES.23

21Glyndwr Matthias, "The Monopoly Strikes Back,"
Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , March 1987, p. 40.
22 Simon Baker, "Eutelsat Closes Rank," Cable and
Satellite E u r o p e , August 1984, pp. 10-11.
2 3 "Eutelsat and Astra Coordinate," Cable and
Satellite E x p r e s s , October 2, 1987, p. 1.
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Eutelsat promised to take an active role in shaping
European developments in satellite television.

It was the

forum for decision-makers in Europe to determine the type
of satellite systems and hence the delivery systems for
television of the future.

European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations

(CEPT)

CEPT was established in 1959 to strengthen rela
tions between postal and telecommunications administra
tions in Europe.

Efforts to provide a more advanced

distribution system for its responsibilities encouraged
CEPT to establish Eutelsat.
of CEPT.

In 1987, 26 nations were part

Its responsibilities included harmonizing the

administrative and technical aspects of the European
P T T s .24

Various Associations
Although not IGOs,

associations have acted together

to bring groups within European nations to help direct
activities in the development of television.

While not

having the same influence and power as IGOs, many of these
organizations had considerable influence because of the
stature of their collective memberships.

Key associations

included the European Federation for Audiovisual
Filmmakers,

the European Cinematographic Office, European

24 Eckstein, Telev i s i o n , p. I 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82
Bureau of Consumer Unions,

and European Association of

Advertising Agencies.

Summary
The involvement of these IGOs in the development
and oversight of various aspects of television resulted in
increased interaction among various European nations at
many levels.
was the EC.

The IGO with the most visibility in Europe
The following chapter is dedicated to its role

in the evolution of television in Europe.
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CHAPTER V
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
AND THE INTEGRATED TELEVISION MARKET

The EC developed out of Jean M o n n e t ’s lobbying for
a sharing of resources in Europe,

specifically the raw

materials that had been a subject of disputes between
Germany and France.1

This cause was taken up by French

Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and on May 9, 1950,
Schuman unveiled a plan that was to bear his name.

The

Schuman Plan called for the pooling of the production of
all coal and steel in France and Germany,
countries wanting to participate.2

as well as other

The proposal was

embraced by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as well
as by the Benelux countries.

On May 4, 1951, France,

Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium,
Netherlands,

the

the

and Italy signed the treaty in Paris that

created the European Coal and Steel Community

(ESCS).

The

dialogue among these nations continued and in 1952 they
created the European Defence Community

(EDC).

The EDC,

although later rejected by the French Parliament and never

bonnet.

M e m o i r s , p. 291-293.

2 Harold Cullender, "France Proposes a Coal-Steel
Pool with German Unit," New York T i m e s , May 10, 1950, p. 1.
83
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put into effect, would have created a combined European
military force-

On March 25, 1957,

the six nations adopted

the Treaties of Rome, which brought into existence the
European Atomic Energy Community

(EURATOM)

and the EC.

These treaties went into effect on January 1, 1958.

Joint

administrative supervision was developed for the three
treaty organizations,

and their activities were generally

referred to in terms of the EC.

The EC sought to establish

a genuine common market among the member-nations,

stimulate

growth and harmonization of member economic policies,
improve the standard of living for their peoples.

and

Customs

duties between members and other restrictions limiting the
flow of goods across borders were to be eliminated.

A

system was to be established to abolish distorted practices
in competition.

Perhaps most importantly,

the EC was given

legal authority to establish a common market among
signatory nations.

Membership in the Community increased

to nine in 1973 with the addition of Denmark,
the United Kingdom,
Greece,
joined.3

Ireland,

and

to ten in 1981 with the addition of

and to twelve in 1986 when Spain and Portugal
In 1987, Turkey applied for admission.
General direction of the EC was provided by the

European Council,

an organization technically not part of

the Treaties of Rome.

Since it included the heads of state

and government for member-nations,

this Council,

so-named

3Europa Yearbook 1 9 8 5 , p. 138.
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in 1975 by then French President Giscard d'Estaing, met
regularly to set the course and approve major policy for
the Community.

By treaty the highest ranking division of

the EC was the Council of Ministers, represented in most
cases by each nation's foreign minister.

The EC Commission

was responsible for the administration of the Community.
Member-nations appointed one member to the Commission, with
the Federal Republic of Germany,

France,

Italy,

and the

U.K. having an additional member to reflect their large
populations.

Once appointed,

commissioners were not to

consult with their governments about Community matters.4
The only part of the EC government directly elected by the
people of Europe was the European Parliament

(EP),

although originally its members were selected by the
national governments.
and watchdog body,

Initially conceived as a consultant

the powers and responsibilities of the

EP increased during the 1980s to include expanded budget
obligations.

The work of the 434-member EP was often

accomplished in committees and subcommittees which studied
and made recommendations on specific subjects.3

Legal

affairs within the Community were the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Justice,
were appointed,

made up of thirteen judges who

at the consent of the national governments,

4 I b i d . , p. 141.
3 The European Parliament (Information Service,
European Parliament:
Luxembourg, 1985), p. 14.
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for terms of six years.

Appeals could be brought to the

Court by member-states, the Council,

the Commission, or any

person or company affected by a decision of any part of the
EC.

All Court decisions were binding and final, and could

not be appealed in national courts.6
The Treaties of Rome and Paris established a
community intended "to lay the foundation of an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe."

The EC was charged

with working to "eliminate the barriers which divide
Europe," and the national governments pledged themselves to
achieve this goal through their signatures on the Treaties
and through their personal and official commitments to
European unity.7

However,

television was evolving

throughout Europe as an industry and a broadcasting medium
along strictly national lines.

Chapter Three of this

thesis detailed the depth to which television policies and
practices were indigenous to each nation-state.

Exacting

regulations in matters such as advertising content and
programming philosophy had the force of limiting
interaction across borders.

Technical standards were

typical of the nationalistic approaches in evidence.
color television was being developed,

As

each nation

5 Commission of the European Communities, The Court
of Justice (Luxembourg:
Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities, 1984), p. 27.
7 European Community Information Service, "Europe
Without Frontiers by 1992," European Community N e w s , August
2, 1985, p. 5.
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determined its own standards for transmission and reception
of television signals.

Even though the EC, the EBU, and

other IGOs were in existence throughout this period,
countries in Europe did not agree upon a single standard
for television.

Most nations adapted the "phase

alteration by line," or PAL system; but France and Greece
opted for the "Sequence Couleur k M6moire," or SECAM
system.8

This led to two separate, parallel technical

systems and divided the European market with resulting
increases in production,

distribution,

and marketing costs.

Fragmentation and inefficiencies multiplied in research and
development,

equipment, quality,

and other aspects.

lack of unity in Europe had many repercussions.

The

An

increasing volume of television equipment sold in Europe
came from Japan and the U.S.
produced in the U.S.

Many television programs were

Europe's lack of harmony and unity

produced the very fragmentation of efforts and
counterproductivity the E C ’s founders had sought to avoid.9
During the 1980s,

the EC began exerting pressure to

move the Community closer to a common market.

In early

1985 then Commission President Jacques Delors told the EP
that Europe had fallen behind "in a world where large
entities dominate."

Europe had manpower and capital

resources comparable to those of the U.S.

and Japan.

"What

8 Lang, World Satellite A l m a n a c , p. 17.
9Eckstein,

T e levision, pp. 3, 53.
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we lack," he summarized,

"is a genuine common market where

all economic and scientific operators can engage more
easily in exchanges and cooperation."

Later that year,

the

Commission reported to the European Council that Europe was
at a "crossroads."

The report concluded that "we either go

ahead— with resolution and determination— or we drop back
into mediocrity."10
Faced with these choices. Community leaders agreed
upon a goal:

the creation of a truly common market without

frontiers by 1992.
removed,

By that year barriers were to be

and the sale and marketing,

products and services,

as well as the flow of

were to be possible as easily across

as within national boundaries.

In February 1986 final

Community approval was given to what was called the "Single
European Act," which made this goal the official policy of
the EC and its individual member-nations.

Every effort was

to be made to make Europe into a unified market by 1992.
The Commission approached every aspect of Europe within EC
jurisdiction to determine how barriers to the common market
could be eliminated.11

Television was one of the

industries on which the Commission focused attention.

The

Commission believed that television was critical to the
development of a unified market,

1 0 Information Service,

and that it was the duty

"Europe Without Frontiers,"

pp. 1-2.
1 1 "The Institutions of the European Community,"
E u r o p e , May 1987, p. 23.
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and the responsibility of the EC both to have and enforce a
Community television policy.12
The following sections summarize the actions taken
by and the perspectives of each branch of the EC pertaining
to television.

This will demonstrate the position each

developed within the 1980s,

and the consensus throughout

the Community on television policy in Europe.

The European Court of Justice
It was said that the foundation for Community
action rested in its legal framework within the Treaties of
Rome and Paris.

The Community was established as a legal

entity with an existence based on law.
gathering of the ECSC Assembly,

At the firs*

Jean Monnet remarked that,

"The union of Europe cannot be based on goodwill alone.
Rules are needed."

He said that the only way to prevent

war was to create institutions and legal systems to sustain
the Community,

and that the Community needed to exist with

"the sanction of law, under the authority of the Court."13
The importance of law to the Community was also echoed by
another of its early leaders, Walter Hallstein,

one time

state secretary in the foreign ministry of the Federal
Republic of Germany.

Hallstein wrote that the EC "is a

creation of law; it is a source of law; and it is a legal

12 Commission,

Television Without Frontiers, pp.

13Monnet, M e m o i r s , p. 384.
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system."

He concluded that Community member-states

"surrender a part of their separate national sovereignty,
and . . . create an entirely new and independent legal
system to which both they as states and their citizens are
subject.M14
The European Court of Justice was established to
interpret and confirm Community actions in light of the
legal parameters of primary and secondary legislation.
Primary legislation applied to agreements made by the
member-states themselves which had the force of creating
binding laws. This consisted of Community treaties and
agreements among the member-states with relevance to
Community life.

Secondary legislation included law created

by Community institutions and international agreements
concluded by the Community as a whole.13

The Court acted

to interpret primary and secondary legislation and provide
clear definitions of the nature and laws of the Community.
An example was the landmark 1962 van Gend en Loos case.

In

this case the Court concluded that the Community was a "new
legal order of international law for the benefits of which
the States have limited their sovereign rights."

The

sovereignty of the Community applied both to member-states

14 Walter Hallstein, Europe in the M a k i n g , tr a n s .
Charles Roetter (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 30, 33.
13 Commission of the European Communities, The
European Community's Legal System, (Luxembourg:
Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1984),

p . 5.
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as well as to the peoples within those states.

Therefore

Community laws created rights and obligations for Community
institutions, member-states,
state.16

and citizens of every member-

In the 1964 Costa versus ENEL case, the Court

ruled that The EC Treaty "created its own legal system
which . . . became an integral part of the legal system of
the Member States and which their courts are bound to
apply."

Through this decision,

an official relationship

was established between national courts and the Court of
Justice, with the Court acting as the final court of
appeals for all actions of national courts.
year,

That same

the Court ruled that "the executive force of

Community law cannot vary from one State to another in
deference to subsequent domestic law, without jeopardizing
the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty."

Here the

Court established its primacy over domestic laws within
member-states in any matter relative to the Community.
Another type of case heard by the Court was proceedings for
annulment.

These proceedings were attempts to overturn

action taken by a Community organization.
brought to the Court by member-states,
organizations,

They could be

other Community

or by individuals.17

The Court heard several cases that allowed it to
apply these principles to television in the Community.

16 Ibi d . , p. 10.
17 Commission, C o u r t , p. 13.
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1984, Gijs de Vrie;;, an EP member
Netherlands,

(MP) from the

argued before the Court that Dutch media laws

violated the Treaty of Rome which allowed for a free flow
of information among EC member-nations.

He attacked Dutch

culture minister Eelco Brinkman for "perpetuating
provincial politics which are not in agreement with the
spirit of the European Community."

In describing what he

expected from the Court, de Vries said,

"There will be very

little left of the Dutch media policy when the European
judge has finished with it."18

The Court agreed with de

Vries and ordered the Dutch government to bring its media
policies in line with the Treaty.19

De Vries vowed to

bring every member-state before the Court if he believed it
violated the Treaties.20

In 1985, de Vries teamed with

French MP Simone Veil to challenge French media laws in the
Court of Justice.

De Vries and Veil claimed French law

violated the Treaty of Rome by restricting foreign station
allocations on cable television systems.21

By 1987 no

decision on this case had been made.
The Court attempted to maintain a balanced approach
toward sensitive issues such as broadcasting.

It sought to

1 8 "Dutch Government may be Forced to Change Media
Law," Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , March 1985, p. 61.
19 Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , June 1985, p. 23.
20 Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , June 19P5, p. 23.
21 "EEC Attacks French Media Law," Cable and
Satellite E u r o p e , September 1985, p. 5.
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protect national interests and at the same time bring media
laws and conditions in member states into line with the
Treaties.

Two of the governing principles of the Court

were consistency and harmonization.

For example,

the 1978

Debauve case involved the Belgian law which acknowledged
the existence of zones of natural reception of foreign
broadcasting stations in Belgium.

In this case the Court

ruled that laws "cannot be regarded as a restriction upon
freedom to provide services so long as those laws treat all
such services identically whatever their origin."

However,

the Court also confirmed that member-states can "grant
television organizations the exclusive right to conduct
radio and television transmissions."

It hereby confirmed

national rights to television monopolies.22
Advertising on television was another volatile
issue taken before the Court of Justice.

The Court

affirmed each n a t i o n ’s right to limit and define as it saw
fit the role of advertising in order to protect the general
interest of the Community.23
The extent to which member-states obeyed court
ruling with which they disagreed was a fundamental factor
in the future of the Community.

A Community document noted

that the member states generally "conform,

sooner or later,

22 Comm i s s i o n , Television Without Frontiers, pp.
150, 160.
23 Ibid.,

pp.

150-1.
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to the Court's judgment."

However,

there had been occa

sions when countries delayed compliance while attempting to
change Community rules.

The document warned that,

behavior became the norm,

"If such

it would threaten the very

foundation of the Community."

This same document stated

that no penalties were available to force member-states to
comply.2 4
While retaining its concern for the protection of
national societies,

the European Court of Justice actions

in the case of the Dutch media laws set a precedent by
ruling that national television policies must conform to
Community law.25

The Court's actions brought focus to the

question of sovereignty in the Community,

the degree to

which the Community had sovereignty over television policy
or any other issue,

and the degree to which national

governments retained it.

The Court of Justice performed a

significant function in interpreting Community law and
providing a forum for legal decisions for the television
debate.

However,

the Community depended on individual

states to comply with Court judgments.

Television and the European Parliament
Since the EP was comprised of 434 members from
nations throughout Europe,

it provided a forum for the

24 C o mmission, C o u r t , p. 12.
25 Cable and Satellite E u rope, June 1985, p. 23.
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discussion and study of many issues of concern to
individual MPs-

Throughout the early 1980s,

several MPs

began stressing the importance of television to the
Community and the need for changes in the manner in which
industry was developing in Europe.

Among the first

activist MPs who favored stronger community action
regarding television were Gijs de Vries and Wilhelm Hahn.
Dutch MP de Vries lobbied through the press,
Parliament meetings,
Justice,

committees, before the Court of

and in other forums,

that a unified television

policy was critical to the creation of an integrated
Europe.

He believed that the on-going fragmentation of the

European market perpetuated an atmosphere that was harmful
to all Europeans.

European companies needed cross-border

advertising and marketing to flourish and were hindered by
the absence of an integrated community.

A united European

television market would stimulate its economy and benefit
every sector in Europe.26

De Vries claimed that too often

Europeans were reactive and were unwilling to work
together,
to act.

and that the EC was mired in bureaucracy and slow
He criticized the EC Commission for being too

timid in pursuing an integrated market.

In 1986 he

observed that the Commission had been working on a
copyright policy for five years without completing a final
draft.

De Vries championed eliminating all but a minimum

2 6 "Dutch Government," Cable and Satellite, p. 61.
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of restrictions on television.
tions,

Some people and organiza

including the EC Commission,

favored quotas of

minimum levels of European-produced programs for all
television services in Europe.

However, de Vries felt this

violated common sense as well as national and Community
commitments within the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade

(GATT).27

He also persistently sought changes in the

media laws for the Netherlands.28
West German MP Wilhelm Hahn introduced the first
motion before the EP recommending that a media policy be
developed for Europe.29

Hahn believed that the media was

the "great gate in European union," and that the common
market could "only be attained if we have a common media
market."

In his view,

television in Europe had to "go

through primordial changes and become European television,"
no longer being national in nature.

The Treaty of Rome

gave the EC not just an opportunity but a mandate to
harmonize the broadcasting activities in the Community.
Hahn,

this harmonization was not optional.30

To

In a December

27Gijs de Vries, speeches delivered at the
Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels,
October 15-16, 1986.
28 Commission of the European Communities,
Spokesman's Service, Document QXW0653/85EN.
29 European Parliament, Debates of the European
Parliament, Document No. 2-329/254, September 12, 1985.
30 Wilhelm Hahn, speech delivered at the Conference
on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October
16, 1986.
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1985 speech in the EP, Hahn remarked that "the introduc
tion of a European media policy will be an important step
towards European union."

The development of satellite

television provided the Community with a great opportunity
to move toward this union.
vision,

In light of satellite tele

he believed the Community had two choices:

"let

the developments unleashed by the new media pass it by or
harness them in a common media policy."

Satellites would

mean the "end to the era of nationally and territorially
limited television zones as they evolved in Europe" in the
1950s.

Television was critical to establishing a common

market because it would be "dismantling the frontiers and
obstacles which have existed between the Member-States."
Hahn claimed that media policy was the "main prerequisite
for imbuing the people of Europe with the idea of European
union."31

Urging by Hahn led the EP to support the

creation of a European-wide common market for radio and
television.33

Hahn was one of the MPs who believed that if

Europeans did not take action to regulate the development
of satellite television, market forces would exert too
strong an influence on Europe.

Hahn warned of American

cultural imperialism since U.S.

firms dominated the

international television and film production industries.

31 European Parliament,

Deb a t e s , September 12,

1985.

32 Jack Monnet, "Euro Parliament Votes to Adopt
Common Market Approach to TV," V a r i e t y , October 23,
1985,
p. 34.
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Europe needed to unite or face domination from America.33

Television and Parliamentary Committees
The EP was divided into eighteen permanent standing
committees that enabled members to study more thoroughly
proposed laws and vital issues facing the Community.
Committees made reports and recommendations for
consideration by the EP as a whole.34

Because of its

growing importance for Community life, television policy
was studied by a number of these committees.

The following

summarizes studies on the impact of television in Europe by
six of these committees.

Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Consumer Protection
This committee noted that television was an "area
of major importance as a result of its considerable and
ever increasing influence on the process of European
unification."

It strongly supported the development of a

television policy within the EC
Europe).

However,

(rather than the Council of

it concluded that laws concerning

television should be enacted at the national level rather
than within the EC "so as to ensure flexibility and speed
of reaction to any complaints."

33 Hahn,

It called for clear

Brussels speech.

34 The European Parliament (Information Service,
European Parliament:
Luxembourg, p. 1985), p. 14.
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standards of programming and advertising content to protect
citizens.3 5

Committee on Youth, Culture,
Education,

Information and Sport

With Wilhelm Hahn as a committee member,

the

committee called on the Commission and the European Council
to move toward a comprehensive European media policy.

This

policy was believed to be vital because a European
television environment was an "essential feature of a
European community in the process of integration.”

There

had to be freedom within the Community to receive
television programming from all member states.

It

recommended the creation of a multilingual European
television service

(like Europa), and the harmonization of

broadcasting laws throughout Europe.36
The committee recognized the importance of
television to the process of European integration.

All

restrictions on transborder transmissions had to be
eliminated if the member-states were to develop closer
ties.

It called on member-states "to give priority to the

trans-frentier broadcasting of European and national
television channels during the development of cable and
satellite television to come, in order to prevent the

•'^Parliament, Document WG

(2J 1738E, p. 8-9.

3 6 Ibid., p . 7.
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process of European integration from being hampered or
jeopardized.”

The development of a united European tele

vision market was vital for the protection and development
of European culture.

It concluded that "Europe's arts

industries require a single domestic market for broad
casting in order to maintain both their cultural and
commercial hold internationally.”37

Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens'

Rights

This committee concluded that telecommunications
was "the most crucial of the challenges" the Community
faced.

Planning had to be started to set up the necessary

telecommunications infrastructures.

Freedom of program

movement across borders was needed.

Legislation within EC

member-states had to be coordinated to increase
harmonization of television activities and to allow Europe
to compete effectively in the manufacturing and production
of equipment and programs in worldwide television
industries.

The committee concluded that "the freedom of

radio and television broadcasting is of vital importance
for the very future of Europe,
also as an economic entity."

not only as a cultural but
However,

efforts to encourage

economic development must not infringe upon the freedoms of
Europe's citizens in any way.38

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., pp. 45-49.
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Committee on Energy, Research and Technology
This committee drew attention to the economic and
cultural factors necessary for the development of the
common market in broadcasting.

For example, the fragmen

tation of the market forced Philips, the Dutch industrial
firm, to produce more than 100 different types of tele
vision sets to meet Europe's varied technical standards.
The committee believed that only by pooling its resources
and by developing a common market would Europe have a
market sufficiently large enough to be able to make the
financial commitments necessary to produce quality
programs.

Without a more integrated market, this committee

projected that expanded satellite television programming
would mean increased dependence on American programs, thus
eroding the European cultural and economic identity.

The

committee recommended that the Community take action to
create economic incentives, remove barriers, and create a
common market, but assure that individual privacy and
European interests were protected.

It warned that inaction

by the Community would lead to increased fragmentation as
well as an erosion of European industries and culture.

It

hoped that the Community had learned from its earlier years
when no European policies were in place.

The EC had to act

aggressively to shape events rather than allowing events in
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the broadcasting industry to develop on their own.39
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
and Industrial Policy
With Gijs de Vries as an active member, this
committee predictably championed the end of national
technical standards for television in favor of European
standards, as well as aggressive development of European
initiatives and policies to assure a voice for Europe in
the future of the international television industry.

There

was a fear that Europe already had waited too long to
combine its resources and energies.

For example, the

Japanese had already made a united effort to establish
standards for the development of high definition television
(HDTV)--a higher quality television technology with better
quality visual images and sound.

European fragmentation

may have allowed Japan to set the pace and forced Europe to
play a subservient role in this industry’s future.40

The

committee blamed much of these problems on the inactivity
of the EC Commission, which had not been forceful enough in
promoting the importance of a strong, unified Community
television policy.

Europe needed to band together in every

way possible to avoid getting further behind.41
39 The European Parliament, Document PE 98.359, pp.
17, 18, 20, 35.
40 European Parliament, Document PE 105.541, pp. 5-10.
41de Vries, Brussels speech.
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Economic and Social Committee
Technically, this organization was not a parlia
mentary committee but rather a group of 156 representa
tives of various unions, multinational corporations, and
other special interests groups in the Community.

It was

used often for consultation by the Commission as well as
the European Council, but it had the prerogative to develop
and express opinions on its own initiative as well.42

In

1975 this committee decided to deliver an opinion on the
importance of telecommunications in the Community "as a
catalyst and instigator of economic and social change."
The committee noted that the Community had only begun to
recognize the importance of this industry and warned that
EC television standards and policies needed to be har
monized.43

Ten years later, in July 1985, the committee

reported that "the creation of a common market for radio
and television would be of great importance" for the
European economy.

It recognized that "cross-frontier

television broadcasting acts as an additional spur to the
creation of efficient integrated communications networks
which are of vital importance for the international
competitiveness of European industry in the future."

Many

thousands of people worked in television-related activities
42 The European Parliament, p. 8.
43 The European Parliament, Official Journal of the
European Communities, December 15, 1975, pp. 23, 24, 27.
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and industries.

This committee stressed the economic

implications for stimulation of television activities,
including government support for programming ventures in
order to achieve better European products.

Such efforts

would stimulate more program production and result in less
need for government support.44
Satellite television represented a new age for the
cons nit!er with increases in programs, services, and options.
The committee warned that satellite technology could help
make the European public a "plaything of those who exercise
a direct influence on the media."

Therefore some measures

were necessary to protect the public from exploitation.
New elites might develop who could create a new kind of
discrimination by excluding access to the media from anyone
they wished to exclude.

Adequate controls over programming

and advertising content had to be maintained to prevent
favoritism and assure that "broadcasting media do not have
a harmful effect on citizens in general and on certain
groups of society in particular."

New television policies

had to be based on the overall good of the Community rather
than on financial gain or commercialism.45
The committee conceded that satellite television
programs had the potential for significant cultural change
44 Economic and Social Committee, Revised Draft
Report on Television Without Frontiers (European Economic
Community:
Brussels, 1985), pp. 8-9.
45 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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and impact.

It cited studies which had demonstrated that

children watched more foreign-language programs from other
countries than adults, indicating that the introduction of
satellite television would produce meaningful modifications
in the lifestyles of future generations.

Countries like

Belgium and Ireland had already experienced significant
cultural impact from programs received from other
countries.

The committee cautioned that these concerns

should not be taken lightly and that the Community must
take steps to make sure that national cultures are not
destroyed or negatively impacted because of satellite
television.

It also warned of the negative consequences if

Europe followed the patterns established in the United
States, opened up the television market, and adopted less
restrictive programming and quality standards.

Europe had

to avoid any development that focused on the profit motive
"by pandering to the wishes of the masses and producing and
sending out nothing but light-entertainment programmes."
This kind of programming might attract large audiences,
increase revenues, and even stimulate European integration.
However, television would lose "its importance as a vehicle
for the dissemination of objective information accessible
to everyone, as an instrument of continuing education, and
as a link between all currents of society."

In this sense,

television needed to be approached from a "cultural and
social point of view."46
4 6 Ibid., pp. 17, 18, 23, 24.
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Summary of Parliamentary Actions
Numerous parliamentary committees, MPs, and
Parliament as a whole concluded that Europe had to develop
a Community-wide television policy.

Some policy recommen

dations differed among these parts of the EC, but there was
general consensus that Europe would never achieve total
integration as long as national governments retained
control over the media.

Much of Parliament’s focus was on

the EC Commission and its initiatives in the Community.
Actions taken by the Commission are explored in the
following section.

The EC Commission and Television
The EC Commission, consisting of 17 members as of
1987, was responsible to ensure that Community rules and
guidelines were observed and respected.

It proposed

actions and policies to the Council of Ministers, imple
mented EC policies, and managed most of the Community
budget.

The Commission approached subjects such as

television from many perspectives.

It had to protect the

human rights of Community citizens as well as uphold the
Treaties and develop a common market.

It was concerned

with the impact decisions and policies had on relations
with non-Community nations and on competition and internal
relations in the Community.

Only after years of study did

the Commission submit its recommendations on television in
Europe.

Issued in June 1984, the report was called,
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"Television Without Frontiers:

Green Paper on the

Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting,
Especially by Satellite and Cable."

This Green Paper

became a focus of the television debate in Europe.

The

paper was written in response to Parliament's resolution on
radio and television broadcasting in the EC of March 12,
1982,

in which the EP recommended that rules be drawn up

for European radio and television broadcasting.

It

acknowledged the importance of other recommendations and
studies within the Community as critical in stimulating its
investigation.

It particularly cited a 1982 report by the

Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information, and
Sport.

This report concluded that the mass media was

"controlled at the national level" and that the EC had to
act at the Community level to increase European identity
through a new Community media policy.

The Commission

recognized the fear expressed by the EC's Political Affairs
Committee that chaos might result if the Community took
either no action or too restrictive an approach.

Article

10 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms guaranteed freedom of expression in
Europe, including freedom "to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers."

The Political

Affairs Committee cautioned that "this open information
market must not mean that satellite broadcasts should be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108
allowed to flood the Community."

At the same time it must

not create such freedom from controls that access to the
media would be decided based on financial resources.

The

Commission was urged to "draw up a directive ensuring that
commercial interests are channeled into a direction
acceptable to the Community and made subject to certain
conditions."«7
The Commission set forth a broad judgment at the
outset of the paper:

the EC had sovereignty over tele

vision in the Community.

It cited several articles within

the Treaties as its justification for this assertion.
Article 60 gave the EC authority over broadcast signals
transmitted or relayed by radio waves within the
Community.

Article 59 provided for the abolition of

restrictions on the freedom to broadcast within the
Community.

Article 62 guaranteed "broadcasters the right

to transmit or relay their signal to other Member States."
Articles 9, 12, 30, and 31 guaranteed "broadcaster
organizations, as well as their suppliers and customers
both at home and abroad, the freedom to take part in
community-wide trade."

Therefore the Treaties gave the

Community jurisdiction over television policies and over
other broadcasting activities in member-states.48

3.

47 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 2"Institutions,” Europe, pp. 23-24.
4« Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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However,

the Commission acknowledged that other

issues relating to television needed to be considered.
Technical, practical, cultural, economic, and social
barriers had to be overcome to achieve a unified European
television policy.

The power of each nation to maintain

some measure of control was never questioned; but standard
ization of technical, legal, and regulatory issues, and
increased harmonization of policies, program standards, and
production throughout Europe was necessary.49
Once the Green Paper was issued, the Commission
became more active in making other recommendations on
European television.

In April 1985, it recommended that

the Community establish a system for aiding television
program and film production in Europe.

It was feared that

without this stimulus, the European production industry
would not be able to compete with the American production
industry.

The Commission proposed that the process of

seeking aid be channeled to stimulate joint ventures
between private and public companies in member-states.

Aid

would be available only to cooperative productions
involving partners from at least three different memberstates.

It was hoped this process would stimulate

integration.50

This proposal focused attention on the

4 9 Ibid., pp. 1-9.
30 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal
for a Council Regulation, Document 85/C 125/09, April 23,
1935, p. 3.
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Commission's belief that only a European approach to
television made sense.

It believed that eventually Europe

would be so unified that it would have the economic and
legal integration to sustain production at the scale
necessary to fill market demand.

All actions concerning

television "must be conceived in international terms since
the use of satellites will make frontiers meaningless."31
Another expression of its concern for television
was the "M.E.D.I.A." program (for "Mesures pour Encourager
le Developpement de 1'Industrie de production
Audiovisuelle," or measure for the development of the
audiovisual production industry).
three measures:

This policy recommended

(1) broadcast standard uniformity;

(2)

audiovisual market flexibility based on recommendations in
the Green Paper; and (3) support and stimulation for
production development.

This policy urged that all

Community branches and member-states work together to
increase the unification and prosperity of the people of
Europe as well as their united influence throughout the
world.

M.E.D.I.A. encouraged the simultaneous production

of programs in many languages in order "to overcome the
language barrier which stands in the way of trading
cultural products."

It also supported development of less

expensive subtitling and dubbing procedures,

cooperative

3 1Commission of the European Communities, Proposal
for a Council Regulation, Document COM (85) 174 final, June
io, 1985, p. 1.
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projects like Europa, and financial backing of multilingual
projects.32

In March 1986, the Commission recommended that

the Community and all member-states adopt a new technical
standard for television transmission, the "MAC family
standards."

This policy was recommended after years of

study involving the EBU, leading industrial organizations,
and national governments.

It set the course for increased

technical harmonization within the Community.33
While the Commission as a whole believed television
was important for integration, individual commissioners
expressed their own personal concern for television’s role
in Europe.

Lord Cockfield actively championed the unifi

cation of television policy within the EC and believed
television would play a decisive role in determining the
future nature of European integration.

In September 1985,

he said that television "can exercise a powerful influence
in bringing together the peoples of Europe into a single
integrated Community."

He warned that it was impossible to

"stop the dissemination of television across the
frontiers."

He feared that "member states, often acting

under pressure from interested lobbies, will try and
introduce regulatory systems which are at variance with one
another" resulting in further fragmentation rather than
52 Commission of the European Communities, The
M.E.D.I.A. Programme, pp. 1-4.
3 ‘Eckstein, Television, p. 61.
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increased unification.

This would undermine the Community

and the good of Europe.

He believed, however, that

television could not be approached in isolation but needed
to be viewed as an integral part of Europe's economic and
cultural objectives.

Rights of citizens and national

interests also could not be overlooked.34
Commissioner for Information Technology Karl-Heinz
Narjes said that "without a standardization policy, Europe
will inevitably be condemned to Babellization."33

He

believed that the Commission needed to work out policies
and actions in close collaboration with industry.

It made

no sense to develop standards that would cripple industrial
firms.

Therefore all sectors within the Community had to

cooperate in developing television policies.36
Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana sought backing for
the Europa project and was among the most vocal in
expressing outrage and disappointment at its termination.
De Meana urged that European television policies be
developed with minimal regulations, primarily concentrating
on the creation of uniform technical standards, stimulating
multilingual broadcasting, and overcoming legal obstacles
34 Statement by Lord Cockfield in reply to the
"Debate on Television Without Frontiers," Strasbourg,
September 12, 1985, pp. 1-4.
33"E .C . Pushes Standards for Telecommunications,"
Europe, July/August 1985, p. 47.
rjb"E.C. Proposal Would Limit TV Advertising,"
Europe, June 19 86, p. 39.
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within the Community.

He was enthusiastic about the

capability of Europa to transmit programs simultaneously in
many languages.

He believed that through this kind of

multilingual service "for the first time since the Roman
Empire" it would be possible for Europe to exist without
language barriers.

The absence of these barriers would

mean a more unified Europe.

Oi Meana pointed to one event

in particular as decisive in his assessment of the
importance of the development of a European approach to
television.

When the U.S. bombed Libya in 1986, he

learned of the bombing while watching the Cable News
Network

(CNN) in a European hotel room.

This privately-

owned U.S. news service provided, he believed,

"only the

American point-of-view and interest" in this international
dispute.

This displayed America's potential dominance of

satellite television programming.

Europe must not allow

American biases and cultural perspectives to shape news
reporting and attitudes of European people.

He favored

further integration of Europe and economic stimulation of
the European programming community in order to develop more
European programming and believed that Europe must become
less dependent on American programming.37

Council of Ministers and European Council
The Council of Ministers and the European Council

37Di Meana, Brussels speech.
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were the only branches of the Community which directly
represented the member-states of the Community.

They had

to balance desires for EC growth and the strengthening of
the European cause in the world with concerns for the
people,
nations.

companies,

and ways of life within their individual

By custom since 1966, all Council of Minister

decisions were unanimous.
lengthy debates, reviews,
agreements.38

This process often required
and compromises to reach

A completed Commission policy

recommendation had to be submitted to the EP for its
consideration and approval.

Once approved by the EP, the

policy was referred to member-state governments for review.
No specific time limits were set for this period;
cases reviews took as long as fifteen years.

in some

Their final

conclusions and recommendations would come through the
Council of Ministers and/or the European Council.

With

Council of Ministers approval, member-nations would be
given a set time to bring their own media policies in line
with Community policies.38

Summary
Throughout the European Economic Community there
was strong belief that television was a decisive factor for
the creation of an integrated Europe.

The Parliament,

38 Stuart de la Mahotidre, Towards One Europe
(Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 297-9.
38 Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , May 1986, p. 47.
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Commission,

and even the Council spoke clearly and often

about the need for European standards and strategies.

The

Court of Justice told the nations they had to comply with
the Treaties they had signed and not hinder the reception
or distribution of broadcasting signals throughout the
Community.

Yet there remained significant national

policies and laws which violated the spirit and even the
letter of the Treaties of Rome and Paris.
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CHAPTER VI
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET

In April 1982, facing uncertain financial return
and significant political and regulatory obstacles, an
English-language television service called "Sky Channel"
began broadcasting via satellite from the U.K.

Rather than

wait for all the legal and political issues involving
commercial television throughout Europe to be resolved,

Sky

Channel decided to move ahead with its distribution and
marketing.

Growth at first was slow, but more and more

cable television systems throughout Europe began asking for
and receiving their government’s approval to carry Sky
Channel.

The public began to be aware of this new service

and demand for it increased.

While national governments,

the EC, and other IGOs wrestled with weighty political
issues such as sovereignty,
programming philosophy.

legal parameters,

and

Sky Channel created a genuine

European television service.1

1 Information regarding Sky Channel and other
television satellite services was based in part on meetings
with the following advertising agency executives:
Ian
Speer, Ted Bates Advertising, London, June 26, 1985; Phil
Reber, Doyle Dane Bernbach Advertising, London, June 28,
1985; Simon Lloyd, Foote, Cone, and Belding Advertising,

116
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Sky Channel's inpact was significant in part
because of the kind of programming it offered.

Many

statesmen and visionaries dreamed of a television service
showcasing exclusively European-produced programs that
would reflect the finest representation of its distinctive
culture.

However,

Sky Channel's schedule was comprised

mainly of movies, older situation comedies, actionadventure series,

and professional wrestling.

Almost ail

of its programming initially was of American origin.2

To

the concern of many leaders in Europe, English-language
programs were beamed across the continent, all to positive
and even enthusiastic reception by the public.

People all

over Europe demonstrated a hunger for the kind of diverse
programming this new commercial service provided.
Overnight, Sky Channel became a sensation.3

By 1987, more

than ten million households across Europe were receiving
English-language programming from Sky Channel.

Less than

three percent of these households were in the U.K.,
demonstrating how European Sky Channel's delivery had
become.4

Its success compounded fears that American

cultural influences, which were perceived already as being

London, June 26, 1985; and Leo Stumpel, Foote, Cone, and
Belding Advertising, Amsterdam. September 28, 1984.
2 Sky Channel sales brochure.
3Brenda Maddox,

"Sky King," pp. 53-55.

4 ”In Vision," Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , June
1987, pp. 54-55.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

118
too strong, might become even stronger.

Rather than a

cultural resurgence for Europe, pan-European television
seemed to be spawning what came to be called "American
cultural imperialism."9
The
inroads and

governments of Europe reacted to the marketing
appeal of Sky Channel in many

ways.

Each

national government retained the right to license reception
of all satellite programming services into the country
through its

PTT.

The exercise of this power violated

Articles 59

and 60 of the Treaty of Rome,

which prohibited

signatory nations from blocking reception of any
broadcasting service sent from another signatory nation.
Since Sky Channel transmitted from the U.K. and was seen at
least in some parts of the U.K.,

it was illegal under

Community law to block its reception for any reason.
this was done.

Since Sky Channel was available only

through satellite distribution,

it had to negotiate with

each national PTT to be cleared for reception.
process took years of negotiations.
persistence,

Yet

This

Through its

Sky Channel overcame distribution obstacles,

and by 1987 it was received in some form in every major
country in western Europe.8
Once Sky Channel proved there was a market for

sDi Meana speech.
6 "In Vision," Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , June
1987, pp. 54-55.
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satellite television in Europe, other services were
developed.

These included services dedicated to French-

language variety programs

(TV-5), religious programs

World Channel), English-language movies
children's shows

(Premiere and TEN),

(The Children's Channel), sports

Sport), women's programming

(Mew

(Screen

(Lifestyle), and several

American networks, including Cable News Network and MTV
Europe.7

In early 1987, the ITV companies of the U.K.

introduced a service called SuperChannel, to compete
directly with Sky Channel for the English-language general
entertainment audience.8

The proliferation of satellite

networks in the late 1980s prompted one television
executive to describe the situation as "technology gone
mad. "9
Interest in Sky Channel and other satellite
television networks was

stimulated by the desire and

need

of multinational corporations for media to deliver
advertising messages to Europe.

Advertising on radio and

television had been unavailable or restricted in all
European markets.10

Restrictions and policies existed in

7 "Datafile," Cable and Satellite E u r o p e , July 1987,
p. 64.
8 Laurel Wentz, "Pan-European TV Rivals Need Larger
Ad Market," Advertising A g e . February 16, 1987.
9 "Crowded Skies Over Europe," Sales and Marketing
M ana g e m e n t . June 1987, p. 35.
10Madlyn Resener, "The Coming Boom in European
Advertising," A d w e e k . September ;8, 1986, p. F.P. 4.
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each nation making it difficult or impossible to develop
advertising and marketing that could be applied throughout
Europe.11

In the Netherlands,

for example, advertising

time had to be requested months and in some cases more than
a year in advance of the airing of the commercial to meet
government guidelines.12

European businesses hoped for

years that television controls would be loosened, new
television services would be introduced,

and that it would

be possible to have the same kind of access and availa
bility advertisers enjoyed in the U.S.13
Sky Channel inaugurated a new kind of delivery
system which allowed an advertiser to transmit one
advertising message and have it received simultaneously
throughout Europe.

Its sales literature proclaimed that

satellite television offered advertisers in Europe "an
entirely new opportunity— a European audience."

Sky

Channel encouraged the development of an integrated market
by appealing to multinational companies and manufacturers
which could use satellite television "to boost and enhance
their brand image, harmonizing product awareness across
Europe."

Sky Channel claimed to be "the first TV station

dedicated to home entertainment across Europe."

The

11 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp.
259-293.
12Stumpel interview.
13 Speer interview.
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emphasis was not on European origins but on entertainment
for Europe.14
The marketplace responded enthusiastically to the
concept of satellite television.

Its introduction in many

nations coincided with the introduction of private tele
vision and/or loosening of standards for commercial
utilization of television.

Authorities from many p ro

fessions throughout Europe and America observed the impact
that the introduction of these new media had on Europe.

A

Lisbon advertising executive said, "Private television will
serve as a catalyst in the market and will open up the
possibility of more new [product] launches."19

An American

marketing executive said he was expecting Europe "to be a
lot more flexible in TV and the marketplace.

Anything that

would deregulate the government shackles on those countries
is good for business and product development."19
advertising manager said,

A French

"We used to talk about pan-

European marketing and advertising only as a theory."

He

concluded that national boundaries were disappearing in
Europe and that advertisers had started to treat Europe as
one market.17

The giant American packaged goods company,

14 Sky Channel Sales Brochure.
18 Julie Skur Hill, "Marketers Eye European TV,"
Advertising A g e , December 1, 1986, p. 68.
16 Ibid.
17Madlyn Resener, "Europe's New Mass Market
Appeal," A d w e e k , June 1, 1987, p. G.A. 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122
Procter and Gamble, began manufacturing products for
European distribution with unified package designs.1*
London executive said,

A

MT o segment markets by nationality

is naive" since Europe's leading businesses looked for
"cross-cultural marketing" which could apply to all
countries in Europe.19

A major international advertising

agency, DDB Needham Worldwide, developed the word
"Euromarketing" to describe its concept of market trends in
Europe.

It concluded that there were few significant

differences in consumer behavior among European peoples
throughout the continent.

They found there were more

things binding Europeans together than dividing them, and
that the trend toward greater commonality and integration
was accelerating.20

In May 1987,

the president of the

European Association of Advertising Agencies, Armand de
Malherbe, predicted that satellite television would
transform Europe into one market.

He concluded that "the

Europe we have known is about to disappear into the mist of
history," and that "the 3,200 miles of frontiers that
divided Europe will be erased."

He said television was the

primary cause of this development.21

A 1986 study by two

18 Ibid.
19 I b i d . , pp. G.A.

6-7.

20 I b i d . , p. G.A. 14.
21 Stewart Alter, "TV Melts Europe's Borders,"
Advertising A g e . May 18, 1987.
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Kent State University professors concluded that three
trends dominated European marketing in the 1930s.

First,

marketers were less concerned about targeting their efforts
at individual national markets.

Instead they were

attempting to reach Europeans as consumers regardless of
the particular nation in which they lived.

Second, more

companies were developing a single product with one image
for all of Europe.

Products in many categories received

common packaging and promotion efforts.

In the past

companies had treated each nation as a separate market.
Third, there was a "rapid increase in the use of satellite
television for commercial purposes."

Satellite television

was proving a tool to stimulate unification in Europe.

The

European consumer had begun to develop a new identity based
increasingly on images originating from outside the nation.
This lead to an expanded sense of Europe as the focus for
the future European market.22
However,

the impact of satellite television did not

mean that Europe existed as a single, unified political
entity.

More often than not, growth of satellite tele

vision came in spite of political obstacles.
Channel's Managing Director,

Sky

Patrick Cox, explained that

the Channel had to overcome enormous legal obstacles
necessitated by the political conditions in Europe.

Even

22 John Ryans, Jr., and Donald Howard, "A
Continental Market," American Demographics M a g a z i n e , July
1987, p. 54.
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if marketing and advertising professionals had begun
treating Europe as one market, each country remained
separate.

Negotiations took place over substantial periods

of time with each governmental organization and with
individual cable systems.

Sky Channel's experience proved

to Cox that the EC needed to lay down and enforce new
ground rules and sweep away the massive confusion that
existed in European television in order for satellite
television services to be able to exist.23

Cox's appraisal

was in contrast to the optimistic press attention Sky
Channel often received.

Sky Channel's successes came at

tremendous cost; it had never been profitable.

In fact, in

September 1987, rumors surfaced that Sky Channel was for
sale or that n ew partners were being sought to help defray
operational costs.24
Sky Channel also introduced another element to the
European satellite television debate:
independently wealthy entrepreneur.

the role of the
In 1982 Sky Channel

was purchased by Australian newspaper magnate Rupert
Murdoch.23

The introduction of a person with the wealth

and independence of Murdoch in an industry previously

23 Patrick Cox, speech delivered at the Conference
on the Future of Television in E u r o p e , B r u s s e l s , October
15, 1986.
2 4 "Murdock Denies Sky Sale Rumor," Var i e t y ,
September 16, 1987, p. 52.
2 3 Sky Channel Sales Brochure.
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controlled almost entirely by governments caused concern in
Europe.

Many people wondered if his involvement in

satellite television was too commercial for the good of
Europe.26

However, Murdoch proved to be merely the first

of the entrepreneurs to enter the satellite television
business.

He was joined by Robert Maxwell, Murdoch's rival

in the English publishing industry, and by the Italian
Silvio Berlusconi,

the Frenchmen Jerome Seydoux,

the

German Leo Kirch, and others.
Berlusconi allied himself with the Socialist Party
in Italy and sought to use this alliance to increase his
influence in Italy and throughout Europe.

He became full

or part owner of television stations in France,
well as Italy.27

Spain, as

Proving the degree to which he was

thinking on a European scale, Berlusconi announced plans to
develop a television service that would help unit the
European market.

"Imagine a single program linking all of

Europe from a single broadcaster,” he said.

"Europe has

been looking for its unity for years, for a United States
of Europe.

Only television can create such a reality."

This ambition made him admired as well as feared.28

26Many speakers, Conference on the Future of
Television in Europe, Brussels, October 15-16, 1986.
2 7 "Toward the Unification of Europe," Videoage,
April 1986, p. 104.
28Jack Loftus, "Italo Kingpin Eyes Pan-Euro TV,"
V a r i e t y , October 23, 1985, p. 1.
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In early 1987, Robert Maxwell, who had already been
involved with several European satellite television
services including the Premiere movie service, created an
organization called the European Television Broadcasting
Corporation.

This corporation was designed to become a new

satellite television service for all of Europe because "the
people of Europe want television without frontiers."**
Another major private satellite television venture was the
Astra project developed by the Soci6t6 Europ6enne des
Satellites

(SES) from Luxembourg.

The important role this

organization played in Europe was symbolized when it hired
of former EC Vice-Commissioner Etienne Davignon. According
to Karl Johannesson, president of one of SES* investors,
the Luxembourg government and its partners were committed
to create a major pan-European satellite delivery system.
It planned to force distribution of its service.

Because

Luxembourg was a member in the EC, no other EC nation
legally could block reception of Astra programs.

SES

planned delivery of private and public television services,
including programs from entrepreneurs like Murdoch and
Berlusconi,

that would bring Europe a new level of

programming choices.30

29Lisa Bannon and Peggy Ziegler, "Maxwell Unveils
Plans for Pan-European Network," Multichannel N e w s . April
13, 1987, p. 1.
30Interview with Karl Johannesson, Virginia Beach,
Virginia, November 21, 1986.
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Major private corporations and entrepreneurs were
not the only ones hoping for new initiatives in private
television in Europe.

Europe's film and television

production industries embraced the new medium of satellite
television and encouraged its development to stimulate
production, create new jobs, and make their industry more
competitive.31

In 1985 companies from six countries agreed

to form a European production group, uniting the skills and
resources of organizations from France, Italy, Austria,
Switzerland,

the U.K.,

and Germany.

Their goal was to

preserve the European content of their programs and promote
Europe's "artistic and production infrastructure."32

Co

ventures like this were formed to meet the projected needs
for the European television industry of the future as well
as to create a uniquely European product that was
marketable in Europe and elsewhere in the world.33

Summary

The private sector shared many of the same hopes of
political leaders for a unified Europe.
Hahn, Lord Cockfield,

Monnet, de Vries,

and others in the political sphere

worked for European integratation, but they faced resist

3 1 "Pic Producers See Savior in TV," V a r i e t y , May
20, 1987, pp. 1, 62.
32Jack Monnet, "Euro-British Production Group
Formed," V a r i e t y . June 29, 1985.
33Cox speech.
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ance from national governments and other forces.

However,

while politicians talked about the day when Europe would
exist without frontiers, businesses began to conduct their
affairs as though the common market existed.

The

development of satellite television provided a means for
men like Murdoch and Berlusconi to televise programs
throughout Europe that could be seen daily by people in
every country.

Through satellite technology, advertising

agencies and multinational corporations could distributing
single product and lifestyle images throughout the
continent.

The private sector grasped the significance of

the communications revolution and for its purposes made the
European market a reality.
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CHAPTER VII
THE EMERGING CONSENSUS
IN EUROPEAN TELEVISION
This thesis set out to demonstrate that there was a
relationship between television and the integration of
Europe.

It specifically attempted to prove the hypothesis

that the integration process in Europe would continue
because of activities in the television industry.
Satellite television was to be deaonstrated to be a
critical factor in this process, and the reaction of
national governaents in Europe to it was a bellwether of
the future of integration.

This also atteapted to

establish that the integration of the television market
needed to precede the integration of the entire European
market.

The work of integration theorists Karl Deutsch,

Ernst Haas, and Amitai Etzioni were cited as the foundation
for this study.

Etzioni's four stage model of integration

was established as the specific framework used to measure
Europe's progress toward becoming an integrated
organization.
A survey of the television market in Europe in
1987 found the market in a state of tremendous flux.

Total

control of television was established by national
129
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governments prior to the introduction of satellites, in
part bacausa of television's power to craata and influanca
images, opinions, and lifastylas.

Television acted to

preserve indigenous cultures and provide common
"communication habits" that helped form a sense of
connunity within each nation.1

Even though the exact

nature varied, controls were part of the fabric of
television in Europe.
in policies.

Yet substantial differences existed

Technical standards and policies on adver

tising varied.

Some nations developed state monopolies

while others let private enterprise have a greater
influence.

Within the EC, the Treaties of Rome and Paris

prohibited nations from blocking reception of broadcast
signals from other member-nations.

While none hindered

reception from over-the-air signals, the growth of cable
television provided a medium through which censorship was
feasible.

Some choices had to be made on the number of

services a cable system would carry and which services
would be carried.

The introduction of satellites further

complicated this problem since more choices were available
for carriage by cable systems.

As cable and satellite

television grew, past national controls over television
remained in effect.

Controls in the satellite era became

communication barriers as they restricted the free flow of
information throughout the Community.2

National

1Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.
2Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 74.
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governments blocked the kind of broad communication
interaction across frontiers that lead to the
establishment of unifying habits which Deutsch claimed were
necessary to achieve integration.*

Rather, nationally

controlled television continued to reenforce national
loyalties, allegiances, and integration.
However, with satellite television it becaae as
simple to receive a transmission from the U.K. in Spain as
in the U.K. itself.

All that was needed was the proper

technical equipment and reception was possible.

Satellite

television unleashed new market forces, changed consumer
demands, and created the potential for communications
systems that were truly European in nature.

In fact,

satellite television provided the instrument through which
integration of the marketplace could move forward and
eventually lead to greater unification of Europe.

It made

it less possible for national governments to control the
flow of information and entertainment in their own
nations.

People throughout Europe would be able to develop

shared habits of communication, which was an essential
element in Deutsch's definition of integration.4
Information through television could then flow to Europeans
not only from national centers but also from locations
throughout Europe.

This kind of movement, in Haas's

3Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.
4 Ibid., p. 41.
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definition of integration, would lead to the shifting of
"loyalties, expectations and political activities" away
from individual nations to a greater European center.8
This investigation revealed how television
activities in Europe through 1987 followed Etzioni*s four
stage model of integration.8

Television was a vital

environmental factor in the life of European society, with
television stations in each country and increasing
attention being given to television activities at both the
national and European levels.

Satellite television was

decisive in creating common perspectives on events that
would be shared by people throughout Europe.7

Leaders

within the EC grasped the impact this innovation had for
the cause of European integration.

They observed that

Europe was fragmented into national markets where
broadcasting activity was regulated by national govern
ments.8

Paralleling Etzioni*s model, the second stage

focused on elite groups and their impact on this
environment.

The concentration accorded television by

groups throughout Europe in the 1980s proved that tele
vision had become a subject of significant concern.
Papers and policy proposals were written and developed by
°Haas, Uniting of Europe, p. 16.
8Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 15, 16, 37, 51.
7Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 70-71.
8Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes," p. 16.
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the EC and Council of Europe.
were formed to administer

Over tine, neny elite groups

or coordinate European actions

toward various facets of television.
EBU, ESA, and EUTELSAT.

These included the

Cooperation in these areas,

coupled with advances in the development of satellite and
cable television led to transitional activities typical of
Etzioni's third stage of unification.

Various unit sectors

began exhibiting characteristics of integration.

In

television these sectors included program production and
governmental departments and private companies responsible
for technical standards.

Significant efforts were made to

establish uniform technical standards, and increased
cooperative program production projects between nations
were begun.

Other agreements on television policies were

agreed upon through the EC and other IGOs.
The movement toward integration of Europe had
advanced in part through the influence of satellite
television.

Yet total integration had not been achieved.

The research that went into this thesis led to agreement
with Levitt that the superior technology of satellite
television would lead to increased reduction in the
barriers that existed throughout Europe.9

Satellite

television had power of enormous magnitude, and the Europe
of 1987 had only begun to experience the force of
innovations in communications technology.

A persistent

9Levitt, Marketing Imagination, pp. 31-32.
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drive in the reseerch end development sectors of major
electronics industries assured on-going technological
advances.

The future promised that new, more powerful

satellites would be built, and that mechanisms to receive
programming services from these satellites would be
available for affordable prices.

Reception clarity would

be enhanced, and viewing options would continue to expand
through the introduction of new programming services and
increased distribution of existing services.

The flow of

events pointed inexorably toward the prospect of more
opportunities for interrationships between people and
organizations throughout Europe through these communica
tions advances.
However, the force of these technologies did not
exist in a free marketplace.

European nations historically

favored controlled growth and regulation of their
economies, particularly following World War II.

They had

demonstrated an understandable desire for the preservation
of their own cultures and ways of life, and resisted
efforts to erode national cohesiveness.10

The willingness

of these nations to embrace integration had come with an
understanding that national sovereignty and the protection
of indigenous cultures would be maintained.

Satellite

television introduced forces that threatened both the
tradition of controls and the nature of society.

National

10Dutch Ministry, Policy Document, p. 10, for example.
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governments which had so carefully guarded their own
societies against influences they deemed harmful or
undesirable were faced with the reality that new satellite
programming services of multiple origins could come into
their nations.

Services were controlled by American

multinational corporations like CNN and MTV, as well as by
entrepreneurs like Berlusconi and Murdoch.

Programs

included what some considered American cultural imperial
ism1 1 as well as programming content that some people
believed was not desirable.1*

They had to find ways to

protect their indigenous cultures, satisfy the demands of
their citizens, and encourage program production.
they had to face financial realities as well.

However,

Satellite

television was more expensive to develop and oversee than
broadcast television.

High costs were a major reason for

the termination of Europa and led to problems for Sky
Channel, Europe's most successful satellite television
service.

Even a nation such as France wondered how it

would pay for its own new direct broadcast satellite.
Nations had to ask if they could afford to fund the
development and oversight of television in the satellite
era.
Television also proved a litmus test of integration
xlDi Meana speech.
12 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 28698.
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efforts.

Nations could not say that they were in favor of

integration and continue to resist reception of satellite
television services.

If nations wanted to increase the

interaction with other citizens and nations of Europe to
the point that they becane integrated, satellite television
provided an ideal vehicle.

If nations sought to foster the

development of a community spirit throughout Europe, what
better way than to encourage the exchange of television
programs from perspectives of many nations and points of
view.

If nations wanted to nourish the European culture

and heritage, television provided a vehicle for an on-going
showcase of European programs and talents.

If nations

wanted to develop a European market without frontiers in
which goods flowed without impediment from nation to
nation, television provided a delivery system for informa
tion about products and services.
The consensus in Europe was that some regulations
over satellite and television use were needed and that a
free market in these industries was not advisable.
Eutelsat believed that there were limits to the number of
satellites that could be supported economically in Europe
and that an unregulated satellite development was
impractical.

The EC, while encouraging pan-European

television, also proposed rules to control its development,
including programming and advertising standards.

The

Council of Europe, as well as the EC and individual nations
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sought to assure protection of minorities from dominance by
the majority.

But the question remained how much regula

tion of television each nation would allow to be made at
the European level and how much it would insist on
retaining.

Each nation also had to determine if its

policies and regulations would encourage pan-European
television or attempt to squelch it.
It is the conclusion of this thesis that the
integration process will continue throughout Europe unless
the national governments prevented it.

Therefore, the fate

of the integration movement rests with these governments.
Their decisions will determine the scope, shape, and
intensity of the integration process.

The first alter

native scenario assumed that integration would not proceed
if national governments reaffirmed their own controls over
television and the rest of national life.

Applying

Etzioni's model, if these governments preserve their
controls over television, they would have reached the
third stage of unification and achieved integration in
selected unit sectors only.

This scenario would mean that

all or some nations have determined not to move forward
into a more fully integrated Europe.

This embrace of

nationalism would suggest a rejection of increased
integration.

This scenario is not likely.

The power and

influence of satellite television are simply too great.
Nations could limit but not eliminate the presence and
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impact of satellite communications.

The spillover of

television programs through broadcast, cable, and satellite
distribution systems has already created interlocking
habits of communication that are essential to the integra
tion process.13

Such new technologies as direct broadcast

satellites and home satellite dishes, as well as further
advances in cable television and KATV systems will make the
blocking of integration of Europe's television market and
the rest of Europe almost impossible.
The second scenario suggested that integration
would proceed along two or more paths simultaneously with
some nations pursuing further integration and others
electing not to pursue it.

However, the fact that some

nations chose to retain stronger national controls would
not mean that others were prohibited from pursuing integra
tion.

A nation with tight controls and concerns about

outside involvement could determine not to pursue panEuropeanism, while other nations would elect to continue
integration efforts.

In Etzioni's model, the nations

seeking greater integration would proceed through the third
stage to the fourth stage, while others would not move to
the fourth stage at all.

This hypothesis included the

assumption that nations would approach integration from
unique and individualistic perspectives.

Some would pursue

integration more aggressively, while others determined to
13Deutsch, Political Community, p. 41.
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move more slowly, or not at all.
fact, fairly realistic.

This scenario was, in

It would allow for more region

alism in which compatible countries would pursue integra
tion or enhanced cooperation.

The nations of Scandinavia

pursued this direction with their Tele-X project, while in
central Europe France and the Federal Republic of Germany
attempted to coordinate their development of satellite
television.

The EC nations could move forward toward an

integrated market without frontiers while other European
nations resisted integration.

Another possibility would be

further integration within the EC itself along regional
lines.

The southern nations (Greece, Italy, Spain, and

Portugal) may become more integrated as would the nations
in the northern part of the Community.

The result of this

scenario would be an integration of a part or of parts of
Europe.
The third scenario tested was a continuation of
the status quo in 1987.

In this scenario, television

activities would continue to include fairly strong national
controls, and nations would work together through various
IGOs on cooperative television ventures.

There would be a

harmonization of technical standards and an attempt to
eliminate any harmful or divisive regulations or laws.

But

the full integration of television policies, as well as the
political sovereignty within Europe, would not be either
abandoned or embraced completely.

Nations would continue
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working together whenever it was advisable, agreeable, or
convenient; but national controls over television and other
aspects of national life would remain f i n .

Satellites

would be used more for national or regional television
purposes, with pan-European efforts restricted through
government controls.

Europe would remain a pluralistic

community and continue to be interrelated rather than
integrated.

It is the conclusion of this thesis that this

scenario was not likely.

The power and potential of

satellite television is too great for the status quo to
continue.

European nations would have to proceed with

integration, individually or as a unit.
Subjects for Further Research
This thesis has approached the impact of tele
vision on the integration of Europe from an essentially
non-quantitative perspective.

It has evaluated the actions

of men, nations, and organizations in light of definitions
provided by integration theorists and attempted to under
stand the integration activities without specifically
measurable variables.

However, this study suggested that

such variables exist and merit further analysis.

These

variable include the following:
1.

The number of non-national services available

for viewing in each country.

If European integration

continues, barriers to reception within Europe should
disappear and more non-national services become available.
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2.

The number of television services transmitting

on satellite.

An increase in satellite television services

would indicate an acceptance of cross border programming as
well as financial conditions conducive to the kind of
monetary commitments necessary to achieve success and
expansion in satellite communications.

The presence of

more private satellite television services would indicate
the existence of a large and unified enough European market
to warrant the private sector to invest in satellite tele
vision.

This also would indicate that national barriers to

television reception had been relaxed.
3.

Television viewing of non-national services.

If integration proceeded, more of these services would be
available and Europeans would spend more time watching
them.
4.

The number of households with access to non

broadcast television reception, including cable television,
private satellite dishes for direct broadcast satellite
viewing, and master antennae systems.

Integration would

mean a reduction of national barriers to the development of
these media.
5.

The elimination or loosening of laws prohib

iting or restricting reception of non-national satellite
services.

The presence of such laws would indicate the

degree to which integration had fallen short.

Their

elimination or loosening would indicate movement toward
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integration.
6.

The number of television programs produced by

multinational organizations, or co-ventures between
organizations in different countries.

Multinational

program production would stimulate the integration process
by increasing interaction and cooperation among peoples in
many nations.
7.

Percentage of airtime on all television

services devoted to European-produced programs.

Increased

production would indicate increased opportunities for
producers in Europe and the opening of the European tele
vision market.
8.

The number of people who spoke and/or

understood languages other than the traditionally dominant
language of their nation.

Increased integration of the

television market would increase the availability of
programs in other languages which in turn would lead to an
increase in the understanding of non-national languages.
Each of the above variables is measurable and can
be tracked to indicate the degree to which integration has
taken place through or because of television activity.
But, in addition to these quantifiable variables, others
exist which cannot specifically be measured but which can
be observed.

Increased activity in these areas would

provide demonstrable evidence of the influence of tele
vision on European integration.
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The content of speeches by heads of state and of
government regarding the role of television in Europe could
be used as indicators.

The more these people address the

television issue the more important television would seem
to be for Europe's future.

Lack of attention by these

people would indicate the absence of a political mandate or
will to address the deeper issues represented by television
and its role in society.

In addition, articles written in

non-television or advertising and marketing industry
publications (such as The Economist and The Times of
London) concerning television and its role in integrating
Europe would indicate its perceived importance to the
overall European marketplace.
Action by European IGOs or national governments
regarding the television industry or policies could be
observed.

These would include actions taken by national

PTTs or broadcasting organizations to encourage European or
multinational approaches to television issues or activ
ities, as well as conferences called by the Council of
Europe, the EC, or other IGOs, to study television issues
or recommend new policies.

Also measurable would be the

creation and approval of copyright regulations that
eliminate problems in receiving or transmitting satellite
or cross-border, over-the-air television services.

The

copyright issues created many problems in developing
satellite television, and a resolution of this issue would
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provide considerable stimulation to the development of
more pan-European activity in the television industry.
Another evidence of integration progress would be the
creation of new IGOs for determing aspects of television
policy or activity.
The elimination or easing of restrictions on the
sale, manufacturing, and installation of home satellite
dishes would indicate that European nations were more
willing for their citizens to receive programs directly
from satellites.

Many experts have predicted that Europe

will be a major market for such direct broadcast satel
lites, but this would not be possible unless governments
throughout Europe eliminated restrictions to their
manufacture and sale.
Trends
A survey of satellite television and the European
marketplace of 1987 has resulted in the development of a
point-of-view on trends that may take place in Europe in
television-related activities in coming years.

The

following trends may be identified as likely, based on this
investigation:
1.

Satellite technology will continue to advance,

as more powerful, technically sophisticated satellites will
be built and launched.

This will enable the development of

smaller mechanisms capable of receiving signals from
satellites, including compact home and portable receive
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units.

Combined with 1ess expensive production end

increased complexity and capacity of micro-technology,
direct satellite-to-home television will become a dominant
television medium in Europe.
2.

The heightened availability of satellite-to-

home television will enable people throughout Europe to
receive more programs than previously.

There will be fewer

national distinctions in programming, and a European focus
will become dominant as station and production executives
target an audience throughout Europe.
3.

Technological means, including audio sub

carrier capabilities, will be developed to enable programs
to be distributed and received in several languages
simultaneously at affordable cost levels.
4.

While Europeans will band together to some

degree, international programming will become organized
more on a global basis, with more co-ventures and joint
productions involving organizations throughout the world.
Economies of scale, international ownership and financing,
and operational efficiencies will lead to cooperation,
production, and distribution by multinational corporations.
The resulting situation will be a hybrid in which more
entertainment programs will be produced internationally but
where local and regional focuses will be created and
sustained through news, cultural, and public affairs
programs.
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5.

European television standards and policies will

be established and clarified allowing national implementa
tion and controls within parameters established through an
expanded EC.

There will be a harmonization of policies of

the EC and the Council of Europe.
6.

Europe will become increasingly integrated,

but national, local, and regional distinctions will remain
and even be intensified in some cases.

There will be

resistance to homogenization, and local and national
factions will urge autonomy and resist Europeanization and
globalization of the media.

Compromises will be arranged

to satisfy national interests, including the encouragement
of national broadcast stations that would continue to allow
national issues and concerns to be met.
7.

Advertising policies will become more

flexible, with general acceptance of advertising as a form
of program funding.

However, advertising will continue to

be regulated by national governments within policies
established at the European level. There will be resistance
to giving advertisers the scope and freedom they are
allowed in the United States.
8.

A new organization will be created within the

EC to oversee television and other mass media.

This

organization will be patterned after the Federal
Communications Commission in the U.S.
9.

The late 1980s and early 1990s will be a time
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in which many satellite television ventures will fail or be
forced to reduce operations due to financial problems.
While Europe moves through a transitional phase in the
integration of the continent and the development of satel
lite communication, costs will remain high; and great
risks will have to be taken to participate in the satellite
television business.

Financial troubles will affect both

private and public television ventures.

Government-

sponsored satellite and television projects will have
economic difficulties, and some will fail.

However, from

these troubles and failures will emerge better planned and
organized television enterprises that are suited to
realistic economic and business-oriented management.
10.

The entrepreneurs who invaded the satellite

television field in its early years will continue to play
an active role in the short-term.

However, pressures will

be brought by various unions, associations, IGOs, and
politicians throughout Europe to limit their influence.
Therefore action will be taken to encourage publicly-backed
services and ventures and to restrict the influence of
entrepreneurs such as Murdoch and Berlusconi.
Conclusion
Regardless of the course the nations of Europe
take in the coming years, television has proven to be a
major factor in its future.

Television will prove to be a

barometer of the nature of European integration, and the
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people of Europe will see their lives influenced nore by
this medium than they have in the past.
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